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I. INTRODUCTION
Can lawyers be disqualified from representation simply because
they have had informal conversations with former employees with
non-disclosure agreements?  A few years ago,1 lead counsel for plain-
tiffs in a major class-action suit faced just such a threat.  A former
* Professor of Law, Drake University Law School.  I am grateful to Dean David
Walker and the Law School Endowment Trust for their generous support of this
project, to Dean Allan Vestal and Professor Keith Miller for their careful readings
and helpful comments, and to my family, as always, for everything.
1. The details of this skirmish are covered by a protective order and not publicly
available.  However, I am personally familiar with the facts through my partici-
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employee of the defendant corporation contacted a journalist writing
about the case with important new information about wrongful acts
taken by the corporation.  The former employee had not previously
been identified during several years of discovery.  The journalist
passed the employee’s name to the plaintiffs’ counsel, and when coun-
sel spoke with the former employee, startling new information came to
light.  A subsequent request for documents related to the disclosure
revealed to the defendant that there was an undisclosed employee
source of information about the corporation, and the defendant de-
manded the name of the former employee.  Upon discovering that the
former employee had signed a non-disclosure agreement, the defen-
dant claimed that the information in question was confidential busi-
ness information, that its disclosure outside of formal discovery
violated the non-disclosure agreement, and that counsel’s conduct was
unethical.  In particular, counsel was alleged to have violated Rule 4.4
of the Model Rule of Professional Conduct,2 which prohibits using a
method of obtaining evidence that violates the rights of third parties,3
by interfering with the non-disclosure contract.  This claim of unethi-
cal conduct then formed the basis for a motion to disqualify counsel
from representation in this major class-action suit, a case that had
been pursued on a contingency basis for several years.
While vigorously opposing the disqualification on the merits at
considerable expense, counsel offered not to use the evidence revealed
by the former employee in order to avoid any suggestion of impropri-
ety.  There was no disqualification in the end, possibly because coun-
sel had asked about the possibility of a non-disclosure agreement and
the former employee had forgotten that any such agreement had been
signed, but it was quite a scare.  What if counsel had not asked or the
employee had remembered?  Would counsel have been disqualified?
What if the evidence given up had been central to the case?
With employer use of non-disclosure agreements proliferating, the
threat of an ethics violation, loss of evidence, and disqualification
could well be enough to discourage lawyers from engaging in informal
discovery with any former employees, some because they may be
known to have signed a non-disclosure agreement, others because
they merely might have signed such an agreement.  However, is there
really any possibility that it is unethical to informally communicate
with a former employee with a non-disclosure agreement, known or
unknown, and could this possibly justify disqualification anyway?
Since Model Rule 4.4 only makes conduct that violates the rights of
pation in the case as a legal expert.  The facts in the actual case have been simpli-
fied and modified for this Article.
2. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2009).
3. Id.
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third parties unethical, the legitimacy of such conduct will depend on
whether it violates the substantive law of contract and tort.
Substantive law often plays an important role in defining conduct
that conforms to or violates the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.4
Criminal law and the law of fraud are particularly important for set-
ting the bounds of ethical conduct.5  Where certain non-criminal con-
duct associated with the practice of law may in fact be “prohibited by
law,” the Model Rules both alert lawyers to this possibility and make
such conduct unethical where illegal.6  Conversely, where statutory
law expressly permits conduct that otherwise falls within broad de-
scriptions of unethical conduct, the Model Rules may make an excep-
tion to the ethical prohibition by referencing authorization by “other
law.”7  Lastly, the Model Rules also require lawyers to determine their
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2009).  The Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, which are published by the American Bar Association, will hereinafter be
referred to as the “Model Rules.”
5. For example, it is an ethical violation to engage in or assist with certain criminal
or fraudulent conduct or fail to take action to avoid assisting a client with a crimi-
nal or fraudulent act. See id. R. 3.4(a) (prohibiting unlawful obstruction, altera-
tion, destruction or concealment of evidence described in the comments to Rule
3.4 as an “offense”); id. R. 3.5(a) (prohibiting influencing judges, jurors and others
“by means prohibited by law”); id. R. 8.4(b) (prohibiting lawyers from committing
criminal acts that suggest a lack of honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a law-
yer); id. R. 1.2(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from assisting a client in or counseling a
client to engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct, where fraud or fraudulent is
defined in Rule 1.0(d) as “conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or
procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction”).
At the same time, it is not an ethical violation to disclose client information to
prevent or mitigate a crime or fraud. See id. R. 1.6(b)(2) (allowing a lawyer to
reveal client information when the lawyer reasonably believes disclosure is neces-
sary to prevent certain crimes or frauds); id. R. 1.6(b)(3) (allowing such disclosure
to prevent, mitigate, or rectify financial/property injury arising from a crime or
fraud).
6. E.g., id. R. 1.5(c) (“A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for
which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is
prohibited by . . . other law . . . .”); id. R. 1.7(b)(2) (“Notwithstanding the existence
of a concurrent conflict of interest . . . a lawyer may represent a client if . . . the
representation is not prohibited by law . . . .”); id. R. 3.4(b) (“A lawyer shall
not . . . offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law . . . .”); id. R.
3.5(c)(1) (prohibiting post-discharge communication with jurors if prohibited by
law); id. R. 3.6(b)(1) (allowing extrajudicial lawyer statements of the identity of
persons involved in litigation “except where prohibited by law”); accord id. R.
1.11(c) (prohibiting former government lawyer conflicts arising from knowledge
of information that the government is legally prohibited from disclosing to the
public or has a legal privilege to avoid disclosing).
7. E.g., id. R. 1.11(a), (c), (d) (prohibiting former government lawyers from certain
conflicted representation “[e]xcept as law may otherwise expressly permit”); id.
R. 1.15(d) (“Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by
agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third
person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to
receive . . . .”); id. R. 1.16(d) (“The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client
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ethical obligations in the context of the law entire, both statutory and
common, such as when it broadly forbids lawyers from representation
of clients that would result in violation of other law,8 or allows a law-
yer to reveal client information when the lawyer reasonably believes
disclosure is necessary to comply with other law.9
Although it may seem unnecessary to make unethical that which is
already illegal, there are good reasons to “piggyback” ethical stan-
dards on at least some legal standards.  First and foremost, our effec-
tiveness as officers of the court, with a primary charge of furthering
respect for and conformity to the law, requires that we ourselves re-
spect and conform to the law, particularly as it applies to our conduct
in the practice of law itself.10  Second, referencing standards that have
been thoroughly worked out in the legal context, such as the criminal
law and the law of fraud, allows the Model Rules to take advantage of
this work without complicating the Model Rules themselves.  Third, it
is generally not unreasonable to expect lawyers to have the skill and
to the extent permitted by other law.”); id. R. 3.5(b) (prohibiting ex parte commu-
nications with judges, jurors or prospective jurors “unless authorized to do so by
law”); id. R. 4.2 (prohibiting communications with represented persons unless
“authorized to do so by law”); id. R. 5.5(b)(1) (prohibiting lawyers not admitted in
a jurisdiction from systematic and continuous practice there unless “authorized
by . . . other law”); id. R. 5.5(c)(2) (permitting temporary practice authorized by
law).
8. E.g., id. R. 1.16 (a)(1) (providing that “a lawyer shall not represent a client or,
where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of
a client if . . . the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional
conduct or other law”); see also id. R. 1.4(a)(5) (“A lawyer shall . . . consult with
the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer
knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct or other law.”); id. R. 1.13(b) (addressing situations where “a law-
yer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated
with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a
matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the
organization, or a violation of law”); id. R. 8.4(a) (prohibiting the use of “methods
of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights” of third parties); id. R. 6.2(a)
(prohibiting a lawyer from attempting to avoid court-appointed representation
unless the representation is likely to result in violation of the law); id. R. 8.4(e)
(barring claims that a lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the law);
id. R. 8.4(f) (prohibiting assisting judges in conduct that violates the law).
9. Id. R. 1.6(b) (“A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to comply with
other law . . . .”); see also id. R. 8.1(b) (2009) (requiring lawyers and applicants for
admission to the bar to respond to lawful demands for information from the bar
except where such disclosures are barred by Rule 1.6).
10. Accord Irma S. Russell, The Evolving Regulation of the Legal Profession: Costs of
Indeterminacy and Certainty 14 (Univ. of Tulsa Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 2009-08), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1357609  (arguing that the in-
corporation of the common law of misrepresentation into Model Rule 4.1, while
injecting the uncertainty of the common law into the rules, “ultimately serves the
interest of lawyers by reminding them of the continuing application of positive
law to lawyers”).
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knowledge required to determine the contours of applicable substan-
tive law; after all, this is precisely what they are expected to do for
clients.  Finally, making such illegal conduct unethical ensures that
the bar can discipline lawyers for conduct it wants to deter, even if
such lawyers have managed to avoid judgment or liability due to lack
of prosecution or suit.
Sometimes, however, determining the legality of “unethical-if-ille-
gal” conduct will require a very complex analysis that may ultimately
produce a conclusion that the legality of the conduct is unpredictable.
In such situations, the purposes otherwise justifying legal referencing
by the ethical rules are not served.  When the law is unclear about
what is and is not illegal, it may not be necessary for lawyers to avoid
such conduct in order to maintain and promote respect for the law.
Indeed, the reference to substantive law in such an ethical rule does
not necessarily reflect agreement that the conduct in question is ethi-
cally problematic.  In addition, what is otherwise a useful shortcut for
the bar fails to operate as such.  Both lawyers and disciplinary entities
will be forced to enter an “ethical rabbit hole”—a long and tangled
detour into the law producing an uncertain answer.  If the possible
ethical violation can be the basis of a motion to disqualify, then clients
and the courts will also suffer the effects of the ethical rabbit hole, as
such motions are easily made, highly strategic,11 expensive to de-
fend,12 and ultimately require a judge to predict how a disciplinary
panel would interpret this uncertain law.
Model Rule 4.4 contains just such an ethical rabbit hole.  The rele-
vant provision states, “In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
. . . use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of [a
third person].”13  To the extent that the Rule forbids criminal methods
of obtaining evidence, the prohibition is clear enough: methods of ob-
taining evidence such as burglary, extortion, physical compulsion, and
illegal phone recordings14 are forbidden to lawyers.  Similarly, to the
11. EXDS, Inc. v. Devcon Constr., Inc., No. C05-0787 PVT., 2005 WL 2043020, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2005) (noting that motions to disqualify not involving direct
conflict of interest are “ ‘part of the tactics of an adversary proceeding’” (quoting
J.P Foley & Co., Inc. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1360 (2d Cir. 1975))).
12. See Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1285 (1981) (“Lawyers have discovered that disqualifying
opposing counsel is a successful trial strategy, capable of creating delay, harass-
ment, additional expense, and perhaps even resulting in the withdrawal of a dan-
gerously competent counsel.”).
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2009).
14. E.g., In re Lebensbaum, No. BD-2005-083, 2005 WL 5177246 (Mass. Bar Discipli-
nary Decisions and Admonitions Nov. 15, 2005) (finding a violation of Model Rule
4.4(a) when a lawyer himself or through his client made an unauthorized entry
into client’s husband’s home office and emailed business records from husband’s
computer to lawyer); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 01-422, at 5–6 (2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
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extent the Rule prohibits methods of obtaining evidence which involve
conduct prohibited by civil statutes or court rules, the reach of Rule
4.4 is not difficult to determine, as such statutes are likely to be quite
narrow.15  However, the Rule also appears to extend its prohibition to
methods of obtaining evidence that involve tortious conduct.  While
this may not be problematic for a good deal of tortious conduct, if a
lawyer’s conduct falls within a tort whose contours are still evolving, it
may be quite difficult to predict whether the conduct will be ethical.
The focus of this Article is on the possibility that a lawyer infor-
mally seeking evidence about an employer from a former employee
will run afoul of the still-evolving tort of intentional interference with
contract.  Now that it is clear that the ethical rules allow attorneys to
contact former employees without notice to, or the consent or presence
of, counsel for their former employer,16 lawyers can use informal
methods of investigation to take advantage of the very useful informa-
tion former employees often have about the wrongdoings of their for-
mer employers17 as long as they steer clear of attorney–client
privileged and work product information18 and a few other avoidable
nosearch/01_422.pdf (noting that nonconsensual recording of conversations is a
crime in a number of states and would violate the proscription against methods of
obtaining evidence that violate the rights of third persons in Model Rule 4.4).
15. E.g., In re Michael L. Freeman, No. 06-2029, 2008 WL 6550121 (Az. Disciplinary
Comm’n Dec. 19, 2008) (finding a violation of Model Rule 4.4 by a lawyer who
obtained counseling records of minor abuse victim by serving a subpoena duces
tecum to the counselor without notice to the minor’s counsel after the trial court
denied the motion to compel production of such records); Conn. Informal Ethics
Op. 96-4, at 2 (1996) (stating that a Connecticut lawyer had violated Model Rule
4.4 simply by receiving a client’s ex-wife’s psychiatric records, when a state law
forbade the disclosure or transmission of psychiatric records without the consent
of the patient and the client had gotten the custodian to improperly release the
records to the lawyer merely by signing his own name to a release request); Carol
A. Gilbert, No. 2005-21, 2005 WL 5177277 (Mass. Bar Disciplinary Decisions and
Admonitions Sept. 16, 2005) (finding a violation of Model Rule 4.4 when a lawyer
used her position as bar advocate in juvenile court to obtain criminal offender
record information about the father of her minor child).
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2009) (“Consent of the organiza-
tion’s lawyer is not required for communication with a former constituent.”); see
also Davis v. Washington Cnty. Open Door Home, No. C-2-98-636, 2000 WL
1457004, at *5 n.8 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2000) (“Requiring the approval and the
presence of corporate counsel would have the inevitable effect of chilling the ex-
change of information, because former employees would most likely be hesitant
about speaking freely in the presence of their former employer’s attorney.”).
17. E.g., EXDS, Inc. v. Devcon Constr., Inc., No. C05-0787 PVT., 2005 WL 2043020,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2005) (noting that informal discovery of former employ-
ees provides relevant factual evidence in a cost-effective manner).
18. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 1 (2009) (stating that “the
rights of third persons . . . include . . . unwarranted intrusions into privileged
relationships”); see also Davis, 2000 WL 1457004, at *5 (noting that opinions by
the Ohio federal courts and the Ohio Supreme Court’s Board of Commissioners
on Grievances  and Discipline had allowed ex parte contact with former employ-
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ethical potholes.19  At the same time, the use of post-employment con-
fidentiality or non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) has proliferated.20
If the former employee in question is subject to an NDA, informal pre-
or post-filing investigative conversations with former employees could
be viewed as tortious interference with these agreements21 and there-
fore a violation of Model Rule 4.4 as well.
The operative words here are “could be.”  Predicting the applicabil-
ity of this tort turns out to be extremely difficult to do with any cer-
tainty.  As the Restatement (Second) of Torts itself notes, “[u]nlike
other intentional torts . . . this branch of tort law has not developed a
crystallized set of definite rules as to the existence or non-existence of
a privilege to act.”22  This means that a crucial element of the tort,
whether the interference was improper or not, must be resolved on a
case-by-case basis by weighing a number of factors, of which the Re-
statement provides only a non-exhaustive list.23  Other elements of the
tort are equally problematic.  Even the application of the litigation
ees conditioned upon avoidance of attorney–client communications, among other
things).
19. Other potential ethical violations that can arise from conversations with former
employees on behalf of a client include violations to Model Rule 4.3 (Dealing with
Unrepresented Person), Model Rule 4.2 (Communication with Person Repre-
sented by Counsel), Model Rule 7.3 (Direct Contact with Prospective Clients),
Model Rule 1.7 (Conflict of Interest), and Model Rule 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing
Party and Counsel). See generally Susan Becker, Discovery of Information and
Documents from a Litigant’s Former Employees: Synergy and Synthesis of Civil
Rules, Ethical Standards, Privilege Doctrines, and Common Law Principles, 81
NEB. L. REV. 868, 889–913 (2003) (discussing all these potential violations).
20. Katherine Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes over the Ownership of Human
Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 723 (2002) (“More and
more, employers are requiring employees to sign covenants not to compete and
covenants not to disclose confidential information at the outset of an employment
relationship.”).
21. Communications with former employees with NDAs through the processes of for-
mal discovery are not prohibited by Model Rule 4.4 for a number of reasons.  Such
communications would not meet many of the elements of the intentional interfer-
ence tort, since the court rather than the lawyer would be inducing the disclo-
sure, discovery disclosures are not a breach of the NDA contract, and the
disclosures would likely fall within the litigation privilege.  Also, as supervised by
a court, such disclosures would be difficult to see as a method “of obtaining evi-
dence that violate[s] the legal rights of [a third] person.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2009).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. b (1979).
23. Id. § 767 cmt. a (noting that resolving the issue of improper interference involves
“the most frequent and difficult problems of the tort of interference with a con-
tract”); see also William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractarians, Community, and the
Tort of Interference with Contract, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1117–18 (1996) (noting
that these “multiple, relatively vague factors make predicting the outcome of liti-
gation very difficult”).
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privilege,24 a well-established common law privilege protecting other-
wise tortious conduct relating to judicial proceedings by lawyers,
judges, parties, and witnesses,25 is unsettled in this context.  Further-
more, such tort liability is premised on a valid NDA that actually cov-
ers the information in question, which raises additional complicated
questions.
To answer the ultimate question about the ethics of such conduct,
it is also necessary to consider whether Model Rule 4.4 should be un-
derstood to make investigation by mere conversation, which is how
the tort would arise, an unethical and prohibited method of obtaining
evidence.  If tort law actually does extend this far, at least in some
jurisdictions, ought we to embrace the limits thereby imposed on law-
24. As will be discussed in more detail, this privilege was initially developed to im-
munize parties and lawyers from defamation suits arising from statements made
in the course of litigation, which could otherwise deter legal action, Price v. Ar-
mour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1258 (Utah 1997) (“The whole purpose of the judicial privi-
lege is to ensure free and open expression by all participants in judicial
proceedings by alleviating any and all fear that participation will subject them to
the risk of subsequent legal actions.”), but it has since been extended in most
jurisdictions to other torts, including interference with contract. See, e.g., Silberg
v. Anderson, 786 P.2d 365, 368 (Cal. 1990) (noting that the California statute
that codified the litigation privilege has been held to apply to “all torts except
malicious prosecution”); Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v.
Cole, 950 So. 2d 380, 384 (Fla. 2007) (“The litigation privilege applies across the
board to actions in Florida, both to common-law causes of action, those initiated
pursuant to a statute, or of some other origin.”); Fisher v. Lint, 868 N.E.2d 161,
170 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (applying the privilege “broadly” to dismiss an inten-
tional interference with advantageous relations claim); Rainier’s Dairies v.
Raritan Valley Farms, 117 A.2d 889 (N.J. 1955) (holding the litigation privilege
extended to intentional interference with business relations); Laub v. Pesikof,
979 S.W.2d 686, 691–92 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding that the privilege extends to
communications in the course of judicial proceedings that would otherwise create
liability for tortious interference with a contract); Price, 949 P.2d at 1258 (holding
that the privilege applies to intentional interference with business relations
claims as well as “all claims arising from the same allegedly defamatory state-
ments”); Clark v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864, 872 (W. Va. 2005) (stating that “the
litigation privilege generally operates to preclude actions for civil damages aris-
ing from an attorney’s conduct in the litigation process . . . [except for] claims of
malicious prosecution and fraud”). But see Kahala Royal Corp. v. Goodsill Ander-
son Quinn & Stifel, 151 P.3d 732, 752 (Haw. 2007) (holding that the litigation
privilege applies to tortious interference conduct only absent proof of malice);
Mantia v. Hanson, 79 P.3d 404, 414 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the other-
wise absolute litigation privilege immunizing attorneys from tortious interfer-
ence claims was lost where the conduct satisfied the requirements for wrongful
initiation of civil proceedings and malicious prosecution); Tulloch v. JPMorgan
Chase & Co., No. Civ.A. H-05-3583, 2006 WL 197009, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 24,
2006) (holding in a diversity case that Texas would not extend the litigation privi-
lege to avoid contract damages for non-defamatory litigation communications in
breach of a contract).
25. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330–31 (1983) (describing the English com-
mon-law roots of the privilege and American acceptance of the privilege).
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yers and make them our own?  If we do rubberstamp such tort law in
the ethical rules, it provides opposing counsel with a very simple and
potent threat; without ever actually litigating the tortiousness of the
conduct or making an ethical complaint, the opposing party can move
to disqualify the lawyer on the mere possibility that a lawyer may
have violated Model Rule 4.4(a) by speaking with a former employee
with an NDA during their investigation of the case.26  This threat so
immediately threatens the pocketbook of lawyers and clients27 that it
may in fact create more deterrence than either the threat of tort liabil-
ity, which is remote in time, expensive for the other side to pursue,
and might be covered by malpractice insurance, or the threat of disci-
pline, which is even more remote as opposing counsel cannot get a
strategic benefit from any possible discipline and likely suffers from
the bar-wide reluctance to report possible ethical violations.  Thus,
without a deliberate decision as to whether we do indeed want to deter
such conduct by litigation counsel, the Model Rules could be under-
stood to have handed opposing counsel a weapon capable of producing
a serious chill in litigation investigations,28 or, at the very least,
greatly increasing the cost of litigation by shifting informal investiga-
tion to formal discovery.
The complexity of the legal and ethical rabbit hole created by the
possibility that Model Rule 4.4(a) includes intentional interference
with contract as a prohibited method of obtaining evidence has re-
quired that this analysis be split into two parts, published as separate
articles.  In the first part I will examine the applicability of the inter-
ference with contract tort to investigative questioning of former em-
ployees with NDAs by litigation attorneys without considering
whether the non-disclosure agreement is both relevant and enforcea-
ble.  In the second part29 I will consider the contract issues involved in
interpreting and enforcing such NDAs, as there can be no tort liability
without a breach of an enforceable contract.  I will also consider in the
second part the extent to which Model Rule 4.4(a) can fairly be under-
26. See Becker, supra note 19, at 981 (noting the threat of ethical violation and trial
sanction when former employees with confidentiality agreements are contacted
ex parte).
27. See Davidson Supply Co., Inc. v. P.P.E., Inc., 986 F. Supp. 956, 958 (D. Md. 1997)
(noting that motions to disqualify “cause tremendous disruption to the orderly
handling of the case (not to mention the expenditure of time and money on mat-
ters ancillary to the merits)”).
28. See Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 159 F.R.D. 441, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stat-
ing that “agreements calling or appearing to call for silence concerning matters
relevant to alleged legal violations, whether or not such agreements are sought to
be enforced, inherently chill communication relevant to the litigation”).
29. Maura Strassberg, An Ethical Rabbit Hole: Model Rule 4.4, Intentional Interfer-
ence with Former Employee Non-Disclosure Agreements, and the Threat of Dis-
qualification, Part II, 90 NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
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stood to extend to such conduct, even if it is tortious, and whether it
ought to cover such conduct.
II. LIABILITY IN TORT
The still evolving tort of “intentional interference with perform-
ance of contract by third person”30 is defined by the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts as follows:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a
contract . . . between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise
causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to
the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the
third person to perform the contract.31
The focus of the discussion in this part of the Article will be on the
application of these tort law requirements to the conduct of a litigation
attorney who seeks verbal information on behalf of a client from the
former employee of a defendant or potential defendant where such for-
mer employee has signed a non-disclosure or confidentiality
agreement.
A. A Contract
To begin with, this tort liability is premised both on the presence of
a contract between “another and a third person” and the breach of this
contract.  For purposes of the tort discussion in the first part of this
Article, we shall assume both an apparent contract of some possible
relevance between the former employee and their former employer
and a breach of the contract, although these raise their own issues
which will be discussed in the second part.  There are, however, two
contract law issues that are expressly taken up as part of the tort law
analysis of the interference tort.  First, a contract that is void ab initio
because it is illegal or in violation of public policy is not a contract at
all32 and cannot be tortiously interfered with.33  The necessity of con-
sidering whether and under what circumstances NDAs may be in vio-
lation of public policy must be resolved to determine the ethics of
conduct under Model Rule 4.4.  However, this will be taken up in de-
tail in the second part of this Article—published separately—as this is
a matter of contract rather than tort law.
A second contract law issue—contracts voidable under the statute
of frauds, mutuality doctrines, and common law defenses like fraud
and duress—has become more generally relevant for the tort law con-
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 774 cmt. b.
33. Id., see also Chemtrust Indus. v. Share Corp., Civ. A. No. H-82-1224, 1987 WL
13822, at *7 (S.D. Tex. June 19, 1987) (providing that “a contract that is held void
as against public policy” cannot “support a tortious interference claim”).
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cerning interference with contract.  There is disagreement as to
whether a contract that is voidable by the breaching party can be tor-
tiously interfered with as “an existing contract” or whether it can only
be interfered with as “a prospective contract.”  The distinction be-
tween interference with an existing contract and a prospective con-
tractual relation has significance because actors have more freedom to
interfere with prospective contractual relations than with actual con-
tracts as long as they do not use methods that go beyond fair competi-
tion.34  In particular, competitive interference with a merely
prospective contract must be independently wrongful or unlawful to
be improper and create liability,35 while this is not the case for inter-
ference with an existing contract.36  The Restatement (Second) of Torts
appears to support treating voidable contracts as existing contracts37
and has garnered a certain amount of support for this position.38
However, the California courts seem to have reversed course on what
first appeared to be support for this Restatement position,39 and the
34. PMC, Inc. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 877, 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768(1)(b) & cmt. e (1979) (wrongful means
must be used for interference with prospective contractual relations to be im-
proper); see also Central Sports Army Club v. Arena Assocs., Inc., 952 F. Supp.
181, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (infancy defense requires showing of wrongful means);
Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 953–54 (Cal. 2003)
(voidable contract requires unlawful conduct).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979) (requiring improper interference
for interference with contract); id. § 767 cmt. c (noting that interference can be
improper even if innocent means are used).
37. The Restatement is not consistent or clear on this point. Compare RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. f (1979) (“The third person may have a defense
against action on the contract that would permit him to avoid it and escape liabil-
ity on it if he sees fit to do so.  Until he does, the contract is a valid and subsisting
relation, with which the actor is not permitted to interfere improperly.”), with id.
§ 774 cmt. b (“The contract, however, may not be void and may be merely voida-
ble by one party or the other or enforceable by one of them.  To the extent that an
agreement is not void but is a subsisting contract, the actor may properly cause
its breach by means that are not wrongful and under the rule stated in this Sec-
tion is still not liable.”). See also Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg.,
406 N.E.2d 445, 449–50 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that the Restatement supports treat-
ing interference with voidable contracts as interference with prospective contrac-
tual relations, while the dissent interprets the Restatement as clearly requiring
voidable contracts to be viewed as existing contracts).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. f (1979) (listing cases citing com-
ment f); see also Woodward, supra note 23, at 1124 n.75 (listing cases supporting
treating invalid contracts as sufficient for the tort).
39. PMC, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. at 886–90 (discussing the history and evolution of Cali-
fornia court rulings on the two interference torts and holding that interference
with contract requires an enforceable, non-voidable contract).
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New York courts have clearly rejected treating voidable contracts as
existing contracts for purposes of this tort.40
Thus, if the contract is voidable and is in a jurisdiction that allows
liability for voidable contracts only as interference with prospective
contractual relations, a good deal of the legal and ethical uncertainty
about what is improper conduct under tort law and Model Rule 4.4 is
alleviated, as the understanding of wrongful or unlawful conduct is in
most instances relatively straightforward; it would include conduct
such as “physical violence, fraud, [bad faith] civil suits and criminal
prosecutions.”41  Of course, this does require the lawyer to determine
that a particular NDA that may be interfered with is voidable by the
employee under contract law.  This in itself is a determination that
will require considerable fact-finding and legal analysis by the lawyer
and would certainly require talking to the very employee covered by
the NDA.  The result of all this analysis merely determines which tort
law standard may apply to the lawyer’s conduct.42
It is also not entirely clear that, even in such a favorable jurisdic-
tion, a lawyer in this situation would enjoy the greater freedom to in-
terfere with prospective contractual relations, as it is limited to the
situation where the interfering actor has a competitive interest in the
prospective relationship.43  In the absence of such a competitive mo-
tive, merely “improper” interference that creates tort liability is de-
fined identically for interference with actual and prospective
contracts.44  Thus, the voidable status of an NDA can only make a
difference to a lawyer’s potential tort liability if a lawyer who induces
a third party to breach a voidable NDA would be viewed as having a
competitive business interest in the information protected by the
agreement.
At first glance, a lawyer’s litigation interest in the third-party for-
mer employee as a witness or source of information seems to have
nothing to do with business competition.  The lawyer is not likely to be
competing for the business of their potential witness’s former em-
ployer.  However, it could be argued that a lawyer paid to investigate a
case for a client is engaged in business and, although the lawyer is not
a buyer of the information arguably protected by the voidable agree-
ment, they are competing for that information with the former em-
40. Guard-Life Corp., 406 N.E.2d at 449 (holding that interference with voidable con-
tracts should be evaluated as interference with prospective contractual relations
but claiming the Restatement supports this position).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 cmt. e (1979).
42. A more detailed discussion of the contract law analysis that would be required to
decide whether an NDA was voidable will be taken up in the second part of this
Article.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 (1979).
44. Id. § 767 (defining “improper” interference for both interference torts).
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ployer.45  As the Restatement does not require the interfering actor
and the person harmed to be competing as seller or buyer46 or limit
the “plane on which they compete,”47 it might be possible for a lawyer
under these facts to gain the more advantageous legal position of
merely interfering with a prospective contractual relation if the non-
disclosure agreement is voidable.  This advantage could make the dif-
ference between potentially unethical conduct under Model Rule 4.4
and ethically permissible conduct under Model Rule 4.4.  However,
there is no case law addressing the competitive status of lawyers in
this context and the argument that lawyers should be considered com-
petitors here is something of a reach.
So far we have seen that to reach a position of possible ethical
safety involving interference with an NDA, a lawyer would already
have had to resolve three significant legal issues for their jurisdiction,
possibly in the absence of relevant case law: (1) the treatment of inter-
ference with voidable contracts, (2) the voidability of the NDA in ques-
tion, and (3) the competitive status of a lawyer relative to the former
employer.  If the voidability of the NDA is unlikely, undeterminable,
or irrelevant, the potential for liability for interference with a valid
NDA must be addressed.  As demonstrated by the analysis that fol-
lows, resolving this question is sure to frustrate a lawyer trying to
balance zealous gathering of favorable information for a client’s case
with an avoidance of ethical violation, legal liability, and
disqualification.
B. Knowledge of the Contract
For liability to attach, the Restatement requires that the interfer-
ing actor have knowledge both that a contract exists between the
plaintiff and another and that the actor’s conduct would interfere with
the other’s performance of this contract.48  It can sometimes be the
case that the attorney will be informed of the existence of the NDA by
counsel for the former employer before even talking to the former em-
ployee, either because the former employee has been identified as part
of mandatory disclosure under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
an “individual likely to have discoverable information”49 or the former
45. But see Dolton v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 642 P.2d 21, 23 (Colo. App.
1981) (finding the defendant lender and officer of the bank—who may have pro-
vided information to the plaintiff real estate developer’s competitor about the
plaintiff’s offer to buy real estate—not to be a competitor of the plaintiff with a
privilege to interfere non-wrongfully).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 cmt. c (1979).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 766 cmt. i (1979).
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A); Becker, supra note 19, at 925 (noting that “[t]he 1993
requirements arguably mandated disclosure of the identity of and information
held by a litigant’s former employees”).
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employer is represented at an initial pretrial conference of parties.50
However, if the lawyer needs to talk to the former employee before the
pretrial conference to know whether they have any discoverable and
relevant information, or before filing suit to determine whether there
is a non-frivolous basis for filing the complaint in the first place, the
employer’s counsel will not have had the opportunity to provide this
information.51  Furthermore, the former employer will not always be a
party to the ultimate litigation, in which case they will not learn of the
lawyer’s interest in the former employee as part of the normal process
of discovery.
The lawyer may also come to know of the existence of an NDA from
the former employee.  If the lawyer is told by the former employee that
an NDA was signed, this would certainly satisfy the requirement that
the lawyer know the contract exists.  However, what if the former em-
ployee tells the lawyer that there is no NDA?  Intentional interference
with contract case law indicates that if the actor is told that there is
no agreement between plaintiff and the other, or that any existing
contract does not require the performance in question, and the actor
has reason to believe these representations, there is no tort liability.52
Thus, as applied to our scenario, if the lawyer has no independent
knowledge of the NDA between the former employee and employer,
and the former employee incorrectly tells the lawyer that there is no
NDA aspect to their employment or severance contract, the lawyer
50. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
51. See Becker, supra note 19, at 920, 926 (noting that Rule 11 may require commu-
nication with former employees before an initial pretrial conference since it re-
quires a reasonable inquiry before filing a complaint).
52. E.g., Tuxedo Contractors, Inc. v. Swindell-Dressler Co., 613 F.2d 1159, 1164 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (holding competitor entitled to rely on representation that any existing
contract would not be interfered with); Hunter Vending Co. v. D.C. Vending Co.,
Inc., 345 A.2d 142, 144 (D.C. 1975) (finding no knowledge of existing contract
between restaurant and vending machine competitor when machines under that
contract had been removed from restaurant and restaurant said there was no
existing contract for vending machines); Telephone & Data Sys., Inc. v. Eastex
Cellular L.P., CIV. A. No. 12888, 1993 WL 344770, at *930–31 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27,
1993) (holding no reasonable implication of a contract where one party told defen-
dant there was an unwritten deal and the other party denied the existence of any
agreement); Ryan, Elliott & Co., Inc. v. Leggat, McCall & Werner, Inc., 396
N.E.2d 1009, 1011–13 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that real estate company
had no knowledge of possible breach when potential employees represented that
their attorneys had advised them they were free to leave their current employer
and contracts for a specific term of years were extremely rare in real estate);
Collins Holding Corp. v. Defibaugh, No. 02-CP-40-3941, 2005 WL 6068060, at *11
(S.C. Ct. C.P. Sept. 6, 2005) (finding that former employees of a game-machine
rental company had insufficient knowledge of exclusive contract when they asked
each customer whether they had such an agreement and each customer denied
that there was).
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would not be viewed as having knowledge sufficient to create
liability.53
However, if the lawyer is not definitively told by either the former
employer or the former employee that there is or is not an NDA be-
tween them, is it possible for the lawyer to have knowledge of the con-
tract sufficient for intentional interference liability to attach?  Does
the lawyer have to ask either the employer or the employee whether
an NDA exists,54 or can a lawyer avoid intentional interference liabil-
ity by assuming there is no NDA in the absence of being told other-
wise?  Certainly, contacting the employer’s counsel prior to talking to
a former employee would complicate a lawyer’s efforts to investigate,
as the employer’s counsel is likely to be as obstructive as possible.
Furthermore, it is generally ethical to talk to a former employee with-
out prior contact with employer’s counsel.55  In addition, as discussed
above, the rules of discovery do not make such contacts per se imper-
missible post-filing and do not even govern such contacts prior to the
initiation of litigation.  Thus, any requirement that the lawyer contact
employer’s counsel about the possible existence of an NDA or discuss
the matter with the former employee would have to come from the
intentional interference tort itself.  As we shall see, however, resolving
this question is complicated by the fact that what counts as “knowl-
edge” varies considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Finally, we also need to resolve how much about the NDA the law-
yer needs to know in order to have the knowledge required for liabil-
ity.  Even a lawyer who is told by a former employee that there was an
NDA the employee remembers signing may not get much, if any, de-
tail about it.  Generally, the law of intentional interference indicates
that the actor must know enough about the contract to understand
that their conduct will produce interference.56  However, it will not
53. But see Eric P. Voigt, Driving Through the Dense Fog: Analysis of and Proposed
Changes to Ohio Tortious Interference Law, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 339, 353–54
(2007) (arguing that an interfering party should not have reasonable grounds to
rely on a denial of a conflicting agreement by the third party when the interferer
has actual knowledge that such an agreement is “common in the industry”).
54. Some NDAs include a non-disclosure provision that covers the NDA itself.  Ask-
ing the employee if they are covered by such an NDA could induce a breach of the
NDA; however, in the absence of independent knowledge of the NDA and the
inclusion of this peculiar provision, such a breach could not be accomplished with
knowledge of the agreement.
55. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2009) (providing that consent of
the organization’s lawyer is not required for communication with a former
constituent).
56. E.g., DiGiorgio Corp. v. Mendez & Co., Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 552, 564 (D.N.J.
2002) (“General knowledge of a business relationship is not sufficient; the defen-
dant must have specific knowledge of the contract right upon which his actions
infringe.”).  Despite frequently being cited for the broad proposition that the de-
fendant need not know the details of the contract, neither Guard-Life Corp. nor
Don King Productions, Inc., support this proposition, as the issue addressed in
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always be necessary to know the exact terms of a contract to be viewed
as knowing that certain conduct would interfere with the other’s per-
formance of this contract.57  Thus, for example, a manufacturer that
knows a potential purchaser of its products has already contracted
with a competitor does not need to know the details of the prior sales
contract when it is clear that inducing the purchaser to buy its prod-
uct instead would lead to a loss of this sale for the competitor.58  In
our scenario, what the lawyer would need to know about the NDA is
whether the information sought by the lawyer would be covered.
However, this issue is also complicated by variation and unpredict-
ability of what counts as “knowledge” from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
1. What Counts as Sufficient Knowledge
Communication with either the employer or employee  can produce
actual knowledge of exactly those facts that show the existence of the
contract and the interference that will be caused, and such actual
knowledge is the evidentiary gold standard for the tort.  It is also gen-
erally agreed that a merely negligent failure to find out about a con-
both cases was the defendant’s lack of knowledge of details that would show the
contract to be legally void or voidable, and in both cases, the defendant’s actual
knowledge of the contract was more than detailed enough to make them aware of
the interfering consequences of their conduct.  Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas,
742 F. Supp. 741, 775–76 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding defendant had reviewed copies
of the actual agreements and believed them unenforceable); Guard-Life Corp. v.
S. Parker Hardware Mfg., 406 N.E.2d 445, 450–51 (N.Y. 1980) (finding defendant
was told both the date through which contractual obligations extended and the
breaching party’s intent to breach the contract to show good faith to defendant).
But see Americable Int’l., Inc. v. Cellularvision, U.S.A., Inc., No. 96 CV 942 (SJ),
1997 WL 597088, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1997) (finding mere knowledge of
cable contract was sufficient to show knowledge that it was exclusive).  However,
in neither of the cases the court cites in support of this proposition was the defen-
dant’s lack of specific knowledge about a known contract at issue.
57. See, e.g., Marks v. Struble, 347 F. Supp. 2d 136, 146–47 (D.N.J. 2004) (finding
complaint alleging knowledge of an attorney–client relationship sufficiently al-
leged knowledge of the attorney–client retainer agreement between the parties);
CompuSpa, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. DKC 2002-0507, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11922,
at *20–22 (D. Md. June 29, 2004) (finding that, on a motion for summary judg-
ment, for a tortuous interference claim to be asserted against it, IBM did not need
to know the technicians it hired away from CompuSpa were required to give
thirty days of notice before quitting as long as it had knowledge of the existence of
the contract); CompuSpa, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 228 F. Supp. 2d 613 (D. Md. 2002); D
56, Inc. v. Berry’s Inc., 955 F. Supp. 908, 915–16 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding that,
despite never seeing a copy of the contract, defendant had sufficient knowledge
that contract prohibited resale where plaintiff sent defendant a letter informing
it of a no resale contract, and defendant had numerous additional sources of in-
formation about such contracts).
58. Hidden Brook Air, Inc. v. Thabet Aviation Int’l Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 246, 279–80
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that an airplane manufacturer knew defendant’s
purchase of plane from it would replace his purchase of plane from competitor).
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tract is insufficient to give rise to intentional interference liability.59
However, there is more than one way knowledge can fall short of ac-
tual knowledge, yet still be considered sufficiently deliberate to
ground intentional action.  Indeed, as many as three different “less-
than-actual knowledge” standards have emerged in intentional inter-
ference case law.
The first standard allows knowledge to be established if the “inter-
fering party had knowledge of such facts and circumstances that
would lead a reasonable person to believe in the existence of the con-
tract and the plaintiff’s interest in it.”60  Under this willful and delib-
erate ignorance standard, a person possesses facts that reasonably
imply other facts but fails to embrace the implications of what is
known.  This failure to “connect the dots” can be viewed as knowledge
sufficient to ground intentional action since it is at least arguable that
a person must in some sense “know” that which they choose not to
accept or confirm, and by choosing not to know they demonstrate the
capacity to act intentionally in relation to what is “known.”
A second approach provides that, in the absence of actual knowl-
edge of the contract, “it is enough to show that defendant had knowl-
edge of facts which, if followed by reasonable inquiry, would have led
to a complete disclosure of the contractual relations and the rights of
the parties.”61  Here, a person knows facts that make them strongly
suspect the truth of additional facts that go beyond that which is im-
plied by what they know, but they willfully and deliberately choose
not to take the steps required to confirm these additional facts.62
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C cmt. a (1979) (articulating a rule of no
liability absent physical harm and noting that “there has been no general recog-
nition of any liability for a negligent interference,” especially in cases where the
defendant has no knowledge of the contract); see also Burnside v. Leimbach, 594
N.E.2d 60, 63 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (stating that “the tort of negligent interference
with a business relation . . . is not recognized as yet in Ohio”); Hartridge v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Wis. 1978) (stating that “under
Wisconsin law intention is an essential element of a claim for damages sustained
as a result of contractual interference”). But see infra note 63 and the cases cited
therein.
60. Exxon Corp. v. Allsup, 808 S.W.2d 648, 656 (Tex. App. 1991).
61. Swaney v. Crawley, 191 N.W. 583, 584 (Minn. 1923); see also Tele-Port, Inc. v.
Ameritech Mobile Commc’ns, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1092  (E.D. Wis. 1999)
(quoting the Wisconsin form jury instruction for the proposition that “[i]t is suffi-
cient that defendant had knowledge of facts which, if followed by inquiry ordina-
rily made by a reasonable and prudent person, would have led to a disclosure of
the contractual relationship,” CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., WIS. CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 2780 (1996)).
62. See State v. McCallum, 583 A.2d 250, 253 (Md. 1991) (stating that “ ‘deliberate
ignorance’ or ‘willful blindness’ . . . exists where a person believes that it is proba-
ble that something is a fact, but deliberately shuts his or her eyes or avoids mak-
ing a reasonable inquiry with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth”)
(citation omitted).
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There is an intentional aspect to this ignorance, but it is a little harder
to say that there is already actual knowledge of facts merely suspected
rather than avoided.  Because it requires that the defendant acquire
new facts that are not mere implications of what they already know,
the “reasonable inquiry” standard is more removed from actual knowl-
edge than the “connect the dots” standard.  As a consequence, the is-
sue of whether the standard has moved from deliberate ignorance to
negligent ignorance is even more likely to arise under this standard
than under the implied, “connect the dots” knowledge standard.63
Finally, a person may fail to reach actual knowledge of the exis-
tence of a contract or its relevant substance not because there is a
deliberate choice not to connect the dots or to follow up on what is
strongly suspected, but rather because there is a reckless or careless
failure to acquire this information.  This latter failure of knowledge is
the “should have known” of negligence.64  Some jurisdictions have di-
rectly allowed a “should have known” gloss to describe knowledge suf-
ficient for the tort.65  Other jurisdictions have adopted a standard of
“actual or constructive knowledge” as sufficient for intentional inter-
ference, and some of these have then adopted the “should have known”
gloss to describe “constructive knowledge.”66  To the extent the
“should have known” gloss is used for this tort, there is the possibility
that mere negligent ignorance will be sufficient for intentional
interference.
The issue of what kind of less-than-actual knowledge may be suffi-
cient for intentional interference is particularly relevant to our scena-
rio, because when a lawyer wants to question a former employee about
their employment and the former employee does not volunteer any in-
63. Compare Twitchell v. Nelson, 155 N.W. 621, 624 (Minn. 1915) (stating that
“[f]rom a knowledge of such facts the law imposes the duty to inquire, and the
failure to do so, either willfully or negligently, constitutes bad faith and the legal
inference of actual knowledge is conclusive”), with Cont’l Research, Inc. v. Crut-
tenden, Podesta & Miller, 222 F. Supp. 190, 199 n.1 (D. Minn. 1963) (suggesting
that subsequent case law indicated that Minnesota would not “impose tort liabil-
ity upon one who was negligent in not finding out about a contract between two
other parties”).
64. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 653, 654 n.23 (Md. 1992) (hold-
ing that knowledge sufficient to show the intentionality required for punitive
damages did not include “ ‘constructive knowledge’ or ‘substantial knowledge’ or
‘should have known,’” but did include a “wil[l]ful refusal to know”).
65. See, e.g., Mid-Continent Tel. Corp. v. Home Tel. Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1176, 1200
(N.D. Miss. 1970) (applying a negligence standard in finding a defendant liable
when they “knew or had reason to know” of a contract); Armendariz v. Mora, 553
S.W.2d 400, 405–06 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (finding a jury instruction that stated
“do you find that . . . Defendants knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should
have known, of the existence of the ‘exclusive concession lease’” to be a proper
restatement of Texas law requiring “knowledge of such facts and circumstances
that would lead a reasonable man to believe in their existence”).
66. See infra subsection I.B.1.d.
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formation about the presence or absence of an NDA, the lawyer will
ordinarily have no independent knowledge of the existence of such an
agreement involving this employee.  If the lawyer does not ask the for-
mer employee whether such an agreement exists, we would want to
know whether the lawyer could ever be viewed as deliberately choos-
ing not to know about the agreement and then whether this would be
legally sufficient to amount to knowledge of the agreement.  Thus, to
address the possibility of intentional interference liability, we must
wrestle with the possibility that some failures to investigate may be
seen as intentional and willful while others may be seen as merely
negligent, as well as with questions about the level of intentionality
required for the tort as a matter of law.
a. Actual Knowledge
Jurisdictions that require actual knowledge of the existence of the
contract, and such facts about the contract as will make it clear that
interference will result from the actor’s conduct, view anything less as
imposing intentional tort liability for mere negligence.  To appreciate
these demands of the actual knowledge standard, it is most useful to
see what fails to count as actual knowledge.  Thus, under New York
law, knowledge that exclusive recording contracts are typical in the
music industry, combined with the fact that such an agreement be-
tween the rock group Chicago and CBS was publicized,  was insuffi-
cient to show that a third party’s distribution of a live Chicago album
was done with knowledge of the CBS contract.67  Similarly, in a New
Jersey case, a beauty supply store that knew only that Matrix sold
beauty products exclusively to salons and fashioned product packag-
ing to discourage non-salon retail sales had insufficient knowledge of
the existence or details of an anti-diversion agreement between a sa-
lon and Matrix.68  Finally, in an Ohio case, Toyota’s knowledge that a
dealership sold a forklift competitor’s products and that exclusive con-
tracts were not unknown in the industry was insufficient to show ac-
tual knowledge of the dealer’s exclusive contract with the forklift
competitor when Toyota also knew that other locations of this dealer
67. CBS, Inc. v. Cineamerica Distrib. Corp., No. 78 Civ. 2245, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14919, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1978); see also Trionic Assocs., Inc. v. Harris
Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 175, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that a new employer’s
lack of actual knowledge of a non-competition agreement meant there was insuf-
ficient knowledge to support an intentional interference claim), aff’d, 198 F.3d
235 (2d Cir. 1999); Roulette Records, Inc. v. Princess Prod. Corp., 224 N.Y.S.2d
204, 207 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962) (reversing an intentional interference judgment
based on a “could or should have known” standard and finding no liability when
no actual knowledge of exclusive recording contract), aff’d, 187 N.E.2d 132 (N.Y.
1962).
68. Matrix Essentials, Inc. v. Cosmetic Gallery, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1237, 1240–47
(D.N.J. 1994), aff’d, 85 F.3d 612 (3d Cir. 1996).
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and other dealerships sold the products of this competitor alongside
those of multiple competing manufacturers, and Toyota had been told
by this dealer that they could and would like to sell Toyota products.69
In all of these cases, the interfering party could have asked and
learned the relevant details of the existing contract but was not penal-
ized for not doing so.
If we apply the actual knowledge standard to our scenario, a law-
yer may only know that the person they would like to interview is a
former employee of a particular employer, and they may or may not
have any actual knowledge about the use of NDAs by this employer or
in this industry.  Under state law that requires actual knowledge and
rejects a duty to inquire standard, the cases discussed above suggest
that having one or both of these pieces of information would not be
enough to satisfy the knowledge requirement for intentional interfer-
ence liability.  However, in states that have adopted an implied knowl-
edge, reasonable inquiry, or constructive knowledge standard, it is
more difficult to predict how this scenario would be evaluated.
b. Implied Knowledge
Under the implied, connect-the-dots standard, actual knowledge of
facts that clearly indicate the existence of a contract makes direct
knowledge of the contract superfluous.  A side issue in these cases is
whether the defendant also “knows” enough about the specific details
of the contract to realize that the defendant’s conduct will interfere.
Where the interference with the contract is as obvious as the existence
of the contract, however, this will not be a problem.  For example, evi-
dence showing a defendant attempted to have an individual fired
trumped its denial of knowledge of both the employment contract and
its details, as it was obvious that being fired both requires a prior em-
ployment contract and would interfere with the employment.70  Simi-
larly, a political campaign committee that knew from its own
purchases that radio and television advertisements required some
kind of contract was also viewed as knowing that asking every radio
and television station in Nevada to refuse to continue to run attack
ads against its candidate would interfere with contracts involving
those ads.71  Finally, the simple observation of a competitor’s bill-
69. Crown Equip. Corp. v. Toyota Material Handling, U.S.A, Inc., 202 F. App’x 108,
113–14 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding these facts insufficient to show actual knowledge
of the contract).  This court also rejected a “constructive knowledge” standard
that imposed liability for what the defendant merely “should have known” on the
ground that a negligence standard would be insufficient to show intentional in-
terference. Id. at 112.
70. Kelly v. Galveston Cnty., 520 S.W.2d 507, 513 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (applying
Texas law).
71. Nat’l Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Friends of Bryan, 741 F. Supp. 807,
813–14 (D. Nev. 1990) (applying Nevada law).
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boards was found to make obvious the existence of a lease between the
competitor and the landowners upon whose land the billboards were
located.72
The question then is whether the existence of an NDA would be
viewed as implied simply from knowledge of a former employment re-
lationship.  In at least one case, implied knowledge of a similar term
in a contract was not found.  In Collins Holding Corp. v. Defibaugh,73
the court suggested that the defendant’s knowledge that their new
customers had a current contract with the defendant’s former em-
ployer and that the former employer “trie[d] to get its customers to
sign exclusive contracts”74 but did not always succeed would not be
sufficient to know that there was an exclusive contract.75  Exclusivity
was a possible, but not necessary, feature of the contract in that case.
Since an NDA is also a possible, but not necessary, feature of an em-
ployment or severance contract, under this case, a lawyer who actu-
ally knew of a company’s not-always-successful attempts to try to get
employees to sign NDAs would not have implied knowledge that a par-
ticular former employee had entered into such an agreement.  If that
is the case, a lawyer who had no particular knowledge of this former
employer’s NDA practices would be even less likely to be viewed as
having implied knowledge of an NDA.
However, at least one case suggests otherwise.  In Crye-Leike Real-
tors, Inc. v. WDM, Inc.,76 a real estate broker was told by a potential
client that the client was being represented by another real estate bro-
ker, but he was not told there was an exclusive agency contract.77  The
court found that knowledge of the other representation, together with
knowledge that “brokers usually attempted to get their clients to sign
agreements with them,”78 was sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact for the jury “as to whether [the broker] had knowledge of
such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to
72. Bocook Outdoor Media, Inc. v. Summey Outdoor Adver., Inc., 363 S.E.2d 390, 394
(S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that the defendant “[knew] or [had] reason to know”
of the agreements because they were “obvious” from the facts).
73. No. 02-CP-40-3941, 2005 WL 6068060, at *14 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Sept. 6, 2005) (apply-
ing a standard in which “[i]mplied knowledge of the contract can satisfy the ele-
ment of the defendant’s knowledge of the contract”).
74. Id. at *15.
75. Id.  The court also stated in dictum that “it is not enough for the plaintiff to show
that . . . exclusive contracts are common in the industry.” Id. at 14 (citing CBS,
Inc. v. Cineamerica Distrib. Corp., No. 78 Civ. 2245, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14919
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1978)).
76. No. 02A01-9711-CH-00287, 1998 WL 651623 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 1998) (ap-
plying Tennessee law).
77. Id. at 6.
78. Id.
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believe in the existence of a contract.”79  However, this was not an
“obvious” inference from the facts.  The fact that brokers try to get
their clients to sign exclusive agreements does not support an infer-
ence in any particular case that this has in fact occurred, unless the
success of these attempts is so great as to make a non-exclusive con-
tract highly unusual, and the opinion does not list this as a fact in the
record.
While Crye-Leike could be criticized as moving too far away from a
deliberate ignorance standard and allowing a more negligent igno-
rance standard to be used, it does suggest that we should be concerned
that use of an implied knowledge standard might in some jurisdictions
justify a finding of sufficient knowledge to support intentionality when
a lawyer merely knows that employment contracts with NDAs are en-
tered into by persons in the former employer’s position with some
regularity.80
This means that, given the state of current case law applying the
implied knowledge standard, which is fairly limited, it is currently im-
possible to predict whether only obvious inferences will be sufficient
for implied knowledge or whether inferences about what is possible or
likely may also be sufficient.  Thus, we have no idea whether a lawyer
whose knowledge might range from the most general—some employ-
ers are imposing NDAs on their employees and former employees—to
the more particular—this employer has required some employees and
former employees to enter such agreements—would be viewed under
this standard as having sufficient facts to reasonably infer that this
employee had such an agreement.  Certainly, a broad application of
this standard could result in most lawyers being viewed as having
knowledge of many former employee NDAs.  With this obstacle re-
moved, the likelihood of tort liability and Model Rule 4.4 violations
expands considerably.
c. Reasonable Inquiry
Reasonable inquiry jurisdictions generally describe the standard of
knowledge required as follows: “[I]t is enough to show that defendant
had knowledge of facts which, if followed by reasonable inquiry, would
have led to a complete disclosure of the contractual relations and the
79. Id. (finding the facts as sufficient to support an inference by defendant that there
was exclusive representation even in the absence of actual knowledge).
80. See also Exxon Corp. v. Allsup, 808 S.W.2d 648, 656 (Tex. App. 1991) (finding
either actual knowledge of lifetime contract due to another corporate employee’s
knowledge, actual knowledge due to the interfering employee being told of the
contract by a third party, or implied knowledge from the third party report and
circumstantial evidence showing unusual treatment of the “lifetime” employee).
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rights of the parties.”81  The reasonable inquiry standard raises the
question of whether a lawyer who knows a potential witness’s employ-
ment history has a duty to inquire further as to possible inclusion of
an NDA arising out of that employment.  However, most of the duty-
to-inquire cases involve actual knowledge of the contract and instead
find a duty to inquire about the relevant terms of the contract.82  In
contrast, when the facts known only suggest the possibility that a con-
tract exists, a duty to inquire about the existence of the contract may
or may not be found.83  This suggests that it would be important to
determine whether an NDA would be viewed as a term of a known
prior employment agreement, which might trigger a duty to inquire
about the terms, or whether it would be viewed as an independent
contract, in which case there might or might not be a duty to inquire.
Unfortunately, NDAs are entered into in a variety of ways.  Non-
disclosure can be a term within a unified contract entered into before
employment begins.  A free-standing non-disclosure agreement can be
signed as a separate form proffered at the beginning of the employ-
ment relationship during orientation or training or even during the
middle of an employment relationship.  Finally, non-disclosure can be
one term in a severance agreement.  In all but the unified pre-employ-
ment contract cases, the NDA is a separate agreement from the em-
ployment agreement.  Clearly, a lawyer without actual knowledge of
the existence of an NDA cannot know which of these scenarios, if any,
might apply to a former employee.  This will make application of the
reasonable inquiry standard immediately problematic.  We can, how-
ever, consider whether the case law finding such a duty to inquire in
either situation suggests that a lawyer with knowledge merely of a
former employment relationship has a duty to inquire as to the exis-
tence of an NDA.
i. Duty to Inquire as to Existence of Contract
Although the case law is limited, it suggests that detailed and indi-
vidualized information about the parties to the unknown contract is
necessary to trigger a duty to inquire as to the existence of a contract.
Indeed, in at least one of these cases, Swaney v. Crawley,84 the infor-
mation known was so detailed that it may have been sufficient to show
81. Swaney v. Crawley, 191 N.W. 583, 584 (Minn. 1923); see also Tele-Port, Inc. v.
Ameritech Mobile Commc’ns, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1092 (E.D. Wis. 1999)
(“ ‘It is sufficient that defendant had knowledge of facts which, if followed by in-
quiry ordinarily made by a reasonable and prudent person, would have led to a
disclosure of the contractual relationship.’” (internal citation omitted)).
82. See infra subsection I.B.1.c.ii.
83. See infra subsection I.B.1.c.i.
84. 191 N.W. 583 (Minn. 1923); 157 N.W. 910 (Minn. 1916).
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that the defendant had actual knowledge of the contract in question,85
but the court found that the evidence was sufficient on the lesser stan-
dard of a duty of inquire.86  The facts showed that the defendant, act-
ing as the agent for a person who sought to sell a contract right to
purchase property, first sought out the plaintiffs as potential purchas-
ers of his principal’s rights.87  As a result of his efforts, the plaintiffs
first entered into a purchase agreement with the owner of the land,
then separately bought the rights under the principal’s contract with
defendant representing his principal at the closing.88  At that closing,
a $1000 down payment under the contract between the plaintiffs and
the landowner was paid by the plaintiffs to the defendant as agent to
discharge back taxes and overdue mortgage interest accrued under his
principal’s previous contract.89  Subsequently, the defendant himself
bought the same land directly from the owner by persuading the
owner that the plaintiffs had been acting for the defendant in their
purchase of the land and not on their own behalf.90  It is difficult to get
much guidance for lawyer liability from a case like this, where the
facts were both enough to support actual knowledge and sufficiently
different from our scenario that direct analogy is impossible.  How-
ever, we can see that the defendant here knew an extraordinary
amount about the parties and their relationships, whether or not he
had actual knowledge of the existence of a contract between the plain-
tiffs and the land owner.  Indeed, the defendant here was personally
involved with the plaintiffs in a way we would not expect our lawyer to
be with the former employer.
In contrast, ACT, Inc. v. Sylvan Learning Systems, Inc.91 gives us a
sense of the kind of weak record that will fail to trigger a duty of rea-
sonable inquiry.  ACT and the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers (NASD) had entered into an interim agreement for the “mutual
development of business opportunities involving computer testing ser-
vices.”92  Subsequently ACT proposed a new agreement under which
NASD would assign its testing centers to ACT.93  NASD instead ac-
cepted a Sylvan Learning Systems offer to manage and then acquire
the same testing centers.94  The issue was whether Sylvan had facts
85. Swaney, 157 N.W. 910 (finding that the jury had enough evidence to conclude
that defendant actually knew of the contract, even if he denied he had such
knowledge).
86. Swaney, 191 N.W. at 584.




91. 296 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2002) (applying Iowa law to affirm summary judgment for
defendant).
92. Id. at 660.
93. Id. at 661.
94. Id.
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sufficient to put it “on notice that it should investigate whether ACT
already had [a contract] that would be breached” with NASD.95  Syl-
van’s vague knowledge that ACT and NASD had been seen doing some
co-marketing and sharing space at trade shows, and subsequent
knowledge during its own discussions with NASD that ACT was sub-
mitting a competing proposal to manage and own NASD’s computer-
ized testing centers, was found to be insufficient to suggest that an
agreement of this kind between NASD and ACT might already exist
and needed to be inquired about.96  We can see that the fact that ACT
and Sylvan were not in the same business and had little to do with
each other, as well as the fact that ACT and NASD were unusual busi-
ness partners, made Sylvan’s lack of suspicion about a possible agree-
ment between ACT and NASD quite reasonable.
The minimum actual knowledge a lawyer in our scenario could pos-
sess would be that a potential witness was a former employee of a
particular employer and, perhaps additionally, the general knowledge
that some employers impose NDAs on some of their employees.  Such
a lawyer might reasonably be viewed as having more reason to be sus-
picious than Sylvan had because, while ACT’s contractual arrange-
ment with NASD was rather unique and unpredictable, our scenario
involves a regularly recurring contractual provision that addresses a
concern shared by many employers.  Yet, even if any lawyer with such
minimal knowledge might reasonably be more suspicious about the
possibility of an NDA whenever a former employee is involved than
Sylvan could have been about an ACT–NASD joint venture, there is
still a large gap between what Sylvan knew and what the defendant in
Swaney knew, making it difficult to predict whether a lawyer would be
viewed as having a reasonable duty to inquire as to the existence of an
NDA as a separate contract.
ii. Duty to Inquire as to the Terms of a Known Contract
Two Minnesota intentional interference cases suggest that a duty
to inquire about the terms of a known contract arises primarily when
a considerable amount of detailed information has already been ob-
tained either by direct contact with the plaintiff or by being the plain-
tiff’s close local competitor.  In Twitchell v. Nelson,97 the defendant
company was not only a competitor of the plaintiff,98 but its officers
also knew that the spring water business the company purchased had
been operating under an agreement with the plaintiff, that the plain-
tiff owned the land on which the spring supplying this business’s
water was located, and that there was a controversy about the plain-
95. Id. at 663.
96. Id. at 662–63.
97. 155 N.W. 621 (Minn. 1915).
98. Id. at 624.
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tiff’s right to rent use of the spring.99  The court concluded that the
defendant actually knew there was some sort of contract with the
plaintiff,100 but he did not actually know that purchasing the assets
would cause the plaintiff to breach a best-efforts obligation contained
in the spring lease.101  However, in the face of their attorney’s advice
and their own understanding of this business, the defendant was
found to have a duty to inquire further about the plaintiff’s rights.102
Similarly, in Kerkhoff v. Kerkhoff,103 new lessees of farmland knew
that the prior sub-lessee was farming this land, used corn stalks to
feed his cattle, and would be upset if they plowed the corn stalks
under.  This then made it unreasonable for them to rely on the owner’s
permission to plow the stalks under without inquiring whether it
would be acceptable to the prior sub-lessee.104  Under the duty of rea-
sonable inquiry, the new lessees were found to have knowledge of the
prior sub-lease of land sufficient to make them liable for interference
with the prior sub-lessee’s rights to harvest corn stalks.105
In the face of the detailed information known by the defendants in
Twitchell and Kerkhoff,106 it was possible to conclude that their fail-
ures to inquire further about the contracts they knew existed was de-
liberate rather than negligent.  However, these cases do not suggest
that a lawyer who knows only that there was an employment contract
with the former employee, but who has no direct contact with the em-
ployer concerning this employment relation and does not operate a
business that competes with employer, has sufficient knowledge to
make a failure to inquire about a non-disclosure “term” deliberate
rather than negligent.
Cases that involve more standardized contracts with an unknown,
but predictably typical feature, may be more helpful. Prudential Real
Estate Affiliates, Inc. v. Long & Foster Real Estate, Inc.,107 involved
Prudential’s right of prior consent and first refusal on the sale of a
99. Id.  In addition, the defendant was advised by its attorney that if it bought the
business a lawsuit might result, and the defendant also had the records searched
for the chattel mortgage securing the lease, which was properly filed and refer-
enced but not actually found. Id. at 623–24.
100. Id. at 624.
101. Id. at 623.
102. Id. at 624.
103. No. C9-98-1134, 1999 WL 88962 (Minn. App. 1999).
104. Id. at *3.
105. Id.
106. See also Tele-Port, Inc. v. Ameritech Mobile Commc’ns, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 1089,
1092 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (finding that a contract to provide cell phone subscribers to
service provider intentionally interfered with competitor’s similar contract when
defendant had actual knowledge of the existence of a similar contract but only
knew the general form and substance of the contract).
107. No. 99-1357, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3394 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2000) (reversing sum-
mary judgment for defendant).
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Prudential real estate brokerage.108  The defendant, Long & Foster,
was the “country’s third-largest independent real estate brokerage
company,”109 and had previously bought franchise brokerages,110 and
knew the brokerage it was purchasing had three more years under a
franchise agreement with Prudential that would be breached by the
sale, yet never asked for a copy of the agreement or inquired about the
terms.111  Although there was no evidence showing that Long & Fos-
ter actually knew that many national real estate brokerage
franchisors similarly restricted sales and transfers, their considerable
experience in buying brokerages suggested they likely either knew
this generally or about Prudential in particular.112  Given all this, the
court concluded that a jury was entitled to consider whether Long &
Foster’s failure to learn about the right to consent and of first refusal
was deliberate.113
Because Prudential involved a contract that was widely used
within an industry—i.e., a real estate brokerage franchise contract—
and one typical version of this contract contained a prior consent and
first refusal provision, it is not hard to compare these facts to our sce-
nario, which involves employment or severance agreements that are
widely used across the public and private sector, and the not atypical
version of such contracts that contain an NDA.  However, an impor-
tant fact that distinguishes Prudential from our lawyer scenario is
that in Prudential the defendant actually knew that the sale would
cause the franchisee to breach its promise to operate a Prudential bro-
kerage for the full term of the contract.  While this is a different
breach than the prior refusal breach, nonetheless, there was already
knowledge of interference in this case.  This would not be present in
the lawyer scenario, as there would be no other known breach of the
employment agreement by discussing the former employment with
the lawyer.  A second distinguishing feature is Long & Foster’s posi-
tion as a competitor within the same industry as Prudential and its
experience with precisely this sort of transaction.  Lawyers are gener-
ally not competitors of employers, or even the ordinary target of NDA
agreements, and would not ordinarily encounter these agreements un-
less either they were involved in drafting, enforcing, or advising on
such agreements for client employers or employees, or had often run
into potential witnesses with such agreements.  Thus Long & Foster’s
level of possible deliberate ignorance does not necessarily translate
108. Id. at *2.
109. Id. at *4.
110. Id. at *13.
111. Id. at *4, *13.
112. Id. at *13.
113. Id. at *15 n.7.
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into deliberate ignorance by lawyers in our scenario, although it is
troubling.
In Salon 2000, Inc. v. Dauwalter,114 we move closer to our scena-
rio, as the issue in that case was the duty to inquire into the absence
or presence of a non-compete clause in a prior employment contract.
The defendant, the owner of a hair salon that hired the plaintiff’s for-
mer employee, was himself a former employee of the plaintiff and as
such had been subject to a non-compete agreement.115  In addition,
the defendant had previously rented space to other former employees
of the plaintiff subject to such non-compete agreements.116  On a mo-
tion for summary judgment, the court found sufficient evidence to cre-
ate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant
actually knew of this non-compete agreement with yet another of the
plaintiff’s former employees, or at least had facts sufficient to require
a reasonable inquiry about its possible existence.117  Comparing the
defendant’s position here to that of a lawyer in our scenario, his per-
sonal experience of the plaintiff’s use of a non-compete agreement as a
small employer with a single category of employees was so suggestive
that it could have been sufficient to provide circumstantial evidence of
actual knowledge by the defendant, let alone a duty of inquiry.  A law-
yer would only have this level of information about an NDA if they
had personal knowledge that this employer insists upon such agree-
ments for all similar employees.
Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co.118 is even closer to our sce-
nario, as it involves a confidentiality agreement as part of an employ-
ment contract.  However, the facts were sufficient in this case to show
actual knowledge as well as a duty of reasonable inquiry.119  Deere
employed former Revere employees to develop new equipment that
was in fact covered by confidentiality agreements between the employ-
ees and Revere, but Deere testified that it did not know about these
agreements.120  Nonetheless, there was evidence to the contrary.  The
Revere employees testified that they told Deere about their employ-
ment contract, and the record included notes by Deere employees
referencing legal concerns arising out of the confidentiality agree-
ments.121  Beyond this, Revere and Deere had previously contracted
about the same equipment the former Revere employees later devel-
oped for Deere, the Deere employee negotiating the subsequent inter-
fering contracts was the primary contact between Deere and Revere
114. No. A06-1227, 2007 WL 1599223 (Minn. App. June 5, 2007).
115. Id. at *5.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 595 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1999).
119. Id. at 764.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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on the earlier contract, and the Deere negotiator had personally
signed a similar confidentiality agreement in connection with his em-
ployment at Deere.122
While Salon 2000 and Revere are similar to our lawyer scenario in
that they involve typical but optional clauses in employment agree-
ments, they are quite different as well.  Not only do both have records
showing particularized knowledge well beyond that which we would
expect a lawyer in our scenario to have, but both records are strong
enough to possibly support findings of actual knowledge of the rele-
vant aspect of the contract.  As such, these cases fail to plumb the
depths of the reasonable inquiry standard and provide little or no gui-
dance as to the sufficiency of a much weaker record under this stan-
dard.  However, they do leave open the possibility that there could be
a duty of inquiry for a lawyer with knowledge merely of a prior em-
ployment contract and the general possibility of NDAs as potential as-
pects of such contracts.  This standard of knowledge therefore further
expands the situations in which there might be possible tort liability
and violation of Model Rule 4.4.
d. Constructive Knowledge
One difficulty with applying the constructive knowledge standard
to our lawyer scenario is that courts use this language to mean many
different standards of knowledge.  For some courts, it really means
actual knowledge, but proven circumstantially rather than by direct
admission.  For example, in Professional Investors Life Insurance Co.
v. Roussel,123 the first case attributing a constructive knowledge stan-
dard to Kansas law,124 some defendants denied knowledge of the con-
tract, and there was no direct evidence showing they were informed of
the contract.  However, there was quite a bit of evidence showing that
they had close ties and dealings in matters related to the contract and
its interference with a defendant who did know about the contract.125
The court allowed the case to go forward because there was “sufficient
evidence from which the defendants’ knowledge of plaintiff’s contract
. . .  [could] be inferred, to allow a jury to determine the truth of the
statements defendants made in their affidavits.”126  Clearly, what this
court meant by constructive knowledge was that the jury would be
122. Id.
123. 528 F. Supp. 391 (D. Kan. 1981).
124. Id. at 397–98 (borrowing this language, including “constructive knowledge,” from
the AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR BUSINESS TORT LITIGATION
§ 1.03 (1980), rather than any Kansas state case law).
125. Id. at 398.
126. Id.
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allowed to consider circumstantial evidence of actual knowledge to
find that there was actual knowledge, even if denied by defendants.127
However, in another Kansas case, we do find a definition of con-
structive knowledge that is clearly less than actual knowledge.  The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant “ ‘knew or should have known’”128
of the contract and the defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds
that this language made a claim for mere negligent interference, an
unrecognized cause of action.129  The court refused to dismiss, finding
that “should have known” was a proper gloss on “constructive knowl-
edge.”130  However, the defendant was correct.  The use of construc-
tive knowledge to mean merely “should have known” makes negligent
ignorance sufficient for knowledge and, therefore, radically changes
the character of the interference tort.
Nonetheless, if we apply a negligent “should have known” standard
to a lawyer in our scenario with minimum knowledge—i.e. there was
an employment contract and some employers impose NDAs on some
employees—we can see that almost any lawyer could be found to be
negligent in failing to inquire about a the presence of an NDA.  The
use of this standard as sufficient for intentional interference would
certainly pose the greatest risk of liability.
e. Conclusion
In sum, a lawyer attempting to evaluate whether a failure to in-
quire would suffice for tort liability could be somewhat secure that
this would not be the case in an actual knowledge jurisdiction.  In ju-
127. Accord Crown Equip. Corp. v. Toyota Material Handling, U.S.A., Inc., 202 Fed.
App’x 109, 112 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that plaintiff need not show direct evi-
dence of knowledge of exclusivity but merely evidence sufficient for the jury to
infer there was actual knowledge); D 56, Inc. v. Berry’s Inc., 955 F. Supp. 908,
916 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (allowing the jury to use “defendants’ ‘constructive’ knowl-
edge” to determine whether “defendants knew of an agreement” and describing
other inferences the jury could make from this evidence); Murnik v. Kabo
Chems., Inc., No. 97 C 1845, 1997 WL 567801, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4,1997) (stat-
ing that “constructive knowledge” of a licensing agreement with a competitor in
the face of defendant’s denial of knowledge could be found when defendant was a
former director of sales and marketing for the competitor, had access to confiden-
tial files about the licensing agreement, and met with the licensor prior to re-
signing to start a competitive business with the licensor); see also Tele-Port, Inc.
v. Ameritech Mobile Commc’ns, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1092 (E.D. Wis. 1999)
(using constructive knowledge to mean either actual general knowledge sufficient
to inform defendant it was interfering even without detailed knowledge of the
agreement or knowledge sufficient to make a reasonable person inquire about
aspects of the agreement which could be interfered with).
128. Indy Lube Invs., L.L.C. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1124 (D.
Kan. 2002) (applying Kansas law).
129. Id.
130. Id. (“Therefore, the court believes that Indy Lube’s ‘knew or should have known’
language is appropriate in this respect.”).
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risdictions adopting one of the other three approaches to the knowl-
edge requirement for tort liability—implied knowledge, reasonable
inquiry, and should have known—and in their application to the novel
scenario of a lawyer interviewing a potential witness with an undis-
closed, un-inquired-about, and unknown NDA, we find another legal
and therefore ethical rabbit hole.  Of particular concern is the fact that
even in those jurisdictions that seem to have addressed the issue of
what kind of less-than-actual knowledge standard they will accept for
intentional interference, few have clearly stated that their standard
calls for more than negligent ignorance or shown through application
of their standards when such less-than-actual knowledge is deliberate
and when it is merely negligent.  In addition, there are few if any
cases in which potentially liable defendants are not deeply enmeshed
in their plaintiffs’ contracts or business worlds, creating a limited abil-
ity to analogize to our scenario.  While this can provide arguments for
distinguishing cases finding knowledge from our scenario, it does not
provide any guarantee that sufficient knowledge of the NDA would
not be found in the presence of very minimal knowledge by the lawyer.
Of course, a prudential approach would suggest that all lawyers
simply ask about NDAs prior to questioning former employees about
their former employment.  The problem with this, however, is that if it
is not either legally or ethically required, why should lawyers do some-
thing that might then make their legal or ethical position worse than
it would be otherwise?  Furthermore, we shall see that even when a
lawyer learns that there is an NDA, it will still be impossible to pre-
dict whether the NDA covers the information sought or is even
enforceable.
C. Inducing or Otherwise Causing the Third Party Not to
Perform the Contract
The Restatement (Second) of Torts requires the interfering actor to
either have induced or otherwise caused the breach.131  Inducement of
a breach is present when the breaching party chooses not to perform
as a result of intimidation or persuasion.132  Causation of a breach is
present when the tortfeasor prevents the breaching party from per-
forming, such as by imprisoning the breaching party or by arranging
for a necessary precondition to performance to be absent.133  When a
lawyer informally questions a former employee with an NDA about
matters covered by the agreement, and the former employee then
breaches the agreement by answering the questions, clearly there is
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
132. Id. § 766 cmt. h.
133. Id.
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no prevention causation, but is there even inducement?134  This an-
swer may depend on precisely how the questioning came about.
If the lawyer were to seek out a former employee who had previ-
ously given no thought to revealing this information and were to per-
suade her to reveal it by offering money, inducement would have
occurred.135  However, suppose the former employee had previously
decided on her own to breach the agreement or had previously actu-
ally breached the agreement by telling someone else this information,
all without any involvement by the lawyer.  If under these circum-
stances, the lawyer, knowing of the agreement, approaches the former
employee, or the former employee approaches the lawyer, and the law-
yer asks questions that elicit information covered by the agreement,
has the lawyer induced the breach?  Central to the issue of causation
of a breach here is the possibility that the breaching party may choose
to breach for their own reasons.136
If the lawyer’s conversation with the employee can be shown to
arise from an independent decision by the employee to breach the
NDA, the lawyer may not be viewed as causing the breach in the sense
required for liability in tort.  In Davis v. HydPro, Inc.,137 a competitor
who had no contact with the breaching party until after the breach
had occurred was found not to be the proximate cause of the breach
merely because it “ ‘reaped the advantages of a broken contract.’”138
In NCC Sunday Inserts, Inc. v. World Color Press,139 when a publisher
of newspaper inserts purchased the business of a competitor who had
independently decided to get out of the business due to a lack of profit-
ability and had negotiated with others for the sale, it could not be
found to have induced the competitor’s breach of its printing con-
tract.140  Similarly, in Ryan, Elliott & Co. v. Leggat, McCall & Werner,
Inc.,141 a real estate agency which hired its rival’s employees was not
found to have induced their breach of contract when the employees
134. A deponent’s responses during formal discovery cannot be said to be induced by
the lawyer at all, but rather by the power of the court. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P.
37(a)(3)(B)(i) (motion for an order compelling a deponent to answer a question).
135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. k (1979) (noting that induce-
ment by offering a benefit will be sufficient).
136. See Sweeney v. Smith, 167 F. 385, 387 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1909) (“The promisor may
have excellent reasons for declining to be bound by the earlier contract, and these
he need not disclose.  If he chooses to take the risk of breaking the first agree-
ment, that is his own affair, which may make him liable on that agreement, but
imposes no obligation on the second promisee.  It is enough for the second prom-
isee that the agreement is now offered to him without his own procurement or
persuasion.”), aff’d, 171 F. 645 (3d Cir. 1909).
137. 839 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App. 1992).
138. Id. at 140.
139. 759 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
140. Id. at 1007, 1013–14.
141. 396 N.E.2d 1009 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
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had already decided to leave, had discussed going into business for
themselves, and had themselves initiated contact with the defendant
agency.142
The key facts in these cases are a decision on the part of the
breaching party to terminate the contract prior to any contact with the
actor, strongly demonstrated in two of these cases by the planning of
post-breach alternatives that did not require the involvement of the
defendant actor at all.  Thus, a lawyer who learns that a former em-
ployee may have relevant information from someone to whom the for-
mer employee has already impermissibly talked has not induced the
breach of the NDA.
Even if the agreement has not yet been breached by the former
employee, it is quite possible that the lawyer may not be found to have
induced an initial breach.  The Restatement states that “[o]ne does not
induce another to commit a breach of contract with a third person
under the rule stated in this Section when he merely enters into an
agreement with the other with knowledge that the other cannot per-
form both it and his contract with the third person.”143  As an illustra-
tion of this, the Restatement offers the situation of B, who is under
contract to sell goods to C, but offers to sell them to A instead, who
accepts the offer with knowledge of B’s contract with C and receives
the goods.144  The Restatement concludes that “A has not induced the
breach and is not subject to liability.”145  The absence of “affirmative,
unduly persuasive, initiating conduct”146 signals a lack of induce-
ment.  Thus, if contact with the lawyer is initiated by a former em-
ployee who volunteers the information protected by a known NDA, the
lawyer would not be understood to have induced the breach.147
142. Id. at 1013 (finding no inducement or other purposeful causation of the breach).
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. n (1979).
144. Id.
145. Id.; see also Kendall/Hunt Publ’g Co. v. Rowe, 424 N.W.2d 235, 245 (Iowa 1988)
(finding that publisher who made regular offer to dissatisfied authors who ap-
proached him did not cause breach of contract with original publisher of these
authors); Corinthian Corp. v. White & Bollard, Inc., 442 P.2d 950, 957–58 (Wash.
1968) (finding that purchaser who was approached by seller and merely accepted
their offer, which produced seller’s breach, did not induce breach).
146. Middleton v. Wallichs Music & Entm’t Co., Inc., 536 P.2d 1072, 1076 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1975) (finding that competing tenant who was aggressively wooed by lessor
over a period of three years and who subsequently knowingly entered into a lease
which violated lessor’s restrictive covenant with another tenant did not induce
the breach of the restrictive covenant). But see S. Union Co. v. Sw. Gas Corp., 180
F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1054–55 (D. Ariz. 2002) (finding that a predisposition to breach
the contract followed by letters and phone calls from defendant which may have
influenced the decision to breach was sufficient causation under Arizona’s “ ‘but
for’ causation standard” whether or not this was inducement).
147. But see Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 804–05 (N.D. Ohio
1965) (refusing to grant summary judgment for a malpractice insurer charged
with inducing breach of a confidential physician–patient relationship, where the
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Even if the lawyer initiates the contact with the former employee,
the lawyer will still not be said to induce the breach in the absence of
“some overt act which influences the promisor to breach his con-
tract.”148  Therefore, liability is only likely to arise in situations where
the lawyer seeks out the former employee and engages in some form of
persuasion to get them to reveal the information.  Case law involving
other types of contracts suggests that telling a former employee that
their NDA with their former employer is unenforceable, advising that
their former employer is unlikely to sue them for breach, or providing
them with an attorney or paying their attorney’s fees if sued would be
viewed as inducing the subsequent breach of such a contract.149
Yet, even in the absence of such financial persuasion there may be
inducement by “moral pressure.”150  What exactly is meant by moral
pressure in this context?  It would seem to involve references to what
is right or wrong, good or bad, from a moral or religious perspective.
Although the Restatement’s “moral pressure” language is quoted in a
number of cases, there is actually very little case law involving induce-
uncontroverted facts showed that the doctor initiated the contact with his in-
surer; however, the possibility of lack of inducement does not appear to have been
argued to the court).
148. Wolf v. Perry, 339 P.2d 679, 682 (N.M. 1959) (holding that ordinary solicitation of
business is not equal to inducement when facts failed to show solicitation oc-
curred after contract came into existence and facts also suggested that breaching
party had already made up his mind not to honor or acknowledge the validity of
contract).
149. See, e.g., IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258, 1275 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (finding use of these tactics by a competitor to lure away agents under con-
tract with a valid one-year non-compete provision constituted inducement), aff’d
in relevant part, vacated in part, 136 F.3d 537, 542 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming
grant of preliminary injunction based on these facts as to the one defendant not
subject to arbitration); Marc Dev., Inc. v. Wolin, No. 93 C 2037, 1996 WL 327782,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 1996) (providing an analysis of the legality of a setoff
scheme could be inducement to execute the scheme); Edward Vantine Studios,
Inc. v. Fraternal Composite Serv., Inc., 373. N.W.2d 512, 515 (Iowa Ct. App.
1985) (suggesting or agreeing to insert indemnity clause in competing contract
was an inducement to breach); Melo-tone Vending, Inc. v. Sherry, 656 N.E.2d
312, 315 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (providing legal defense to breached contract was
both inducement and improper means); Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d
518, 528 (Ohio 1999) (finding that law firm induced breach of confidentiality
when it proposed that hospital hire it to screen patients with unpaid bills to de-
termine Supplemental Security Income eligibility); see also Unarco Material
Handling, Inc. v. Liberato, 317 S.W.3d 227, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) (describing
an attorney’s negotiation of an indemnification agreement that would hold the
former employee harmless for breach of a confidentiality agreement as inducing
the breach); Becker, supra note 19, at 913 (suggesting that offering to serve as
counsel for the former employee could be viewed as an improper inducement to
testify favorably prohibited by Model Rule 3.4).
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. k (1979).
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ment by moral pressure.  In Alberts v. Devine,151 the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court found that Methodist clerical authorities
could be held liable for a breach of confidentiality by a minister’s psy-
chiatrist if they induced this disclosure by “a simple request or persua-
sion exerting only moral pressure.”152  Unfortunately, there are no
details reported about precisely what was said to induce the psychia-
trist to make the disclosures or what the disclosures were.  We can
imagine, however, that the clerics may have suggested to the psychia-
trist that his patient might not be fit to be a minister given his mental
health issues, and disclosure of this information was necessary to pro-
tect his parishioners or the church itself.
In Augustine v. Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith,153 com-
plaints to a radio station by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) about
the plaintiff allowing members of the National Socialist White Peo-
ple’s Party to make objectionable anti-Semitic and racist remarks
without limit or disclaimer during his talk show154 were viewed as
exerting moral pressure on the station, causing the plaintiff to be
fired.155  Moreover, in Greenfield v. Central Labor Council of Port-
land,156 while the Oregon Supreme Court found the kind of persua-
sion exerted by unions peacefully picketing business with signs saying
“unfair to organized labor” to be otherwise lawful,157 because it con-
sisted of “communication[s] . . . for the purpose of presenting argu-
ments and appeals to their free judgments,”158 the court did make it
clear that stating that a business is “unfair to organized labor” in a
picket line is at least an inducement by moral pressure to employees
not to work and customers not to shop.159
Thus, if the lawyer extols the virtues or victimization of the plain-
tiff, derides the evils of the defendant, or holds out the justice that
may be achieved as a way of persuading the potential witness to be
responsive, we may say that moral pressure has been applied and that
inducement has occurred sufficient to create the possibility of tort lia-
bility.  Indeed, even if the lawyer does no more than simply explain
who they are representing and what the case is about,160 thus al-
151. 479 N.E.2d 113, 124 (Mass. 1985) (deciding reported questions of law and revers-
ing grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants).
152. Id. at 121 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. k (1979)).
153. 249 N.W.2d 547 (Wis. 1977).
154. Id. at 549.
155. Id. at 553.
156. 192 P. 783 (Or. 1920) (involving a conspiracy to injure or destroy business claim).
157. Id. at 789–90.
158. Id. at 789 (quoting Iron Molders’ Union No. 125 v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 F. 45,
51 (7th Cir. 1908)).
159. Id. at 788–89.
160. See Becker, supra note 19, at 902 (indicating that Model Rule 4.3 has been widely
understood to require a lawyer contacting a non-client former employee to inform
them from the outset of “the nature of the case, the identity of the lawyer’s client,
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lowing the former employee to make up their own mind based on the
facts of the litigation as to whether they are morally or otherwise in-
clined to provide the information, the lawyer may be said to have in-
duced the breach.161
Under this case law, a lawyer questioning a former employee may
or may not have induced them to breach an NDA.  The former em-
ployee may have already breached the agreement or decided indepen-
dently to do so, but if not, then it will take very little on the part of the
lawyer for the lawyer to be seen as causing the breach by financial
inducement or moral pressure.  Thus a lawyer attempting to avoid tort
liability must take care to understand how they came to know of this
former employee and determine whether the former employee has
their own reasons for speaking to the lawyer.  However, as we shall
see below, even if financial inducement or moral persuasion was em-
ployed, there is a possibility that the interference will be viewed as
privileged, just as peaceful picketing was viewed as a legitimate activ-
ity by labor unions despite the interference that resulted.
D. Intentionally Interfere
As we are dealing with an intentional tort, it is crucial that the
interference be intentional.  Knowledge of existence of the contract is
a critical foundation for intention, because inducing a breach without
knowing breach is a possible consequence cannot be intentional.  Per-
suasive inducement is also critical, as the absence of inducement pro-
vides no action to which intent can attach.162  However, if there is
both knowledge of the contract and persuasive inducement, does this
always amount to intentional interference?  Would a lawyer who per-
and the fact that the person’s former or current employer is an adverse party”
(quoting Brown v. St. Joseph’s Cnty., 148 F.R.D. 246, 254 (N.D. Ind. 1993)) (citing
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-359 (1991))).
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. k (1979) (stating that “it may be a
statement unaccompanied by any specific request but having the same effect as if
the request were specifically made”); see, e.g., Panko v. Consol. Mut. Ins. Co., 423
F.2d 41, 43–44 (3d Cir. 1970) (describing as evidence of inducement an insurer’s
request that a physician fill out a report and discussion of patient with physician
but affirming grant of summary judgment for defendant insurer on other
grounds).
162. See, e.g., Davis Chem. Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 826 F.2d  678, 687 (7th Cir. 1987)
(finding that, while doctors breaching a contract to staff a medical facility using
special equipment were substantially certain that a breach of the equipment
purchase contract would result from their breach, inducement was missing be-
cause there was no conduct preventing or persuading the facility to breach the
equipment contract); Click Model Mgmt., Inc. v. Williams, 167 A.D.2d 279, 280
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (finding that, when model dissatisfied with her agency com-
plained to a friend, who then connected her to the friend’s agency, friend’s actions
were insufficient for liability, because although a substantially certain result
would be breach of original agency contract, there was no persuasion by friend).
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suades a former employee to talk about their former employment,
knowing that they were subject to an NDA, be viewed as intending to
cause the breach?
The Restatement first defines intent as “denot[ing] that the actor
desires to cause consequences of his act.”163  However, it also says
that while “all consequences which the actor desires to bring about are
intended,”164 consequences need not be desired to be viewed as in-
tended.  Intended consequences also include those that the actor
knows prior to acting are “certain, or substantially certain, to result
from his act.”165  Thus “an interference that is incidental to the actor’s
independent purpose and desire but known to him to be a necessary
consequence of his action”166 is a basis for liability.  At the same time,
“[a]s the probability that the consequences will follow decreases, and
becomes less than substantial certainty, the actor’s conduct loses the
character of intent, and becomes mere recklessness.”167
1. Incidental Intent
It is probably fair to say that a lawyer who wants to question a
former employee with an NDA has no desire to produce a breach of
that agreement; indeed, they would be perfectly happy if the agree-
ment could be honored and their questions answered.  Thus, if there is
any intent present, it must be incidental and result from the lawyer’s
certainty or substantial certainty that answering the questions will
result in a breach of the NDA.  In this regard, it is useful to look at
cases in which inducement was present but incidental intent was not.
In Augustine v. Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith,168 discussed
above,169 the court determined that the complaints made by the ADL
were not intended to result in the firing of the plaintiff in either of the
senses required by the Restatement.170  Since the complaints made
were simply about the program policy of the station and were not di-
rected at either the plaintiff or his employment, there was no evidence
to show a desire to produce plaintiff’s termination.  Nor was it possible
to find that the termination of plaintiff’s employment was a certain or
substantially certain result of these complaints since other responses
could have occurred instead.171
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1979).
164. Id. § 8A cmt. b.
165. Id.
166. Id. § 766 cmt. j.
167.  Id. § 8A cmt. b.
168. 249 N.W.2d 547 (Wis. 1977).
169. Supra text accompanying notes 153–55.
170. Augustine, 249 N.W.2d at 554–55.
171. Id.
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This kind of disjunction between the conduct and the possible con-
sequences would not seem to be present in our scenario.  Although the
level of persuasive inducement in Augustine might be similar to that
used by a lawyer to minimally persuade a former employee to reveal
information about the former employer, the conduct of answering the
questions is specifically sought by the lawyer.  Since this is precisely
the conduct that could breach the NDA, there is no uncertainty of this
kind about whether breach will occur.  However, there is a very differ-
ent source of uncertainty in our scenario that may prevent lawyer in-
terference of this kind from being intentional.
2. Substantial Certainty With Actual and Less-Than-Actual
Knowledge
In order to have incidental intent, our lawyer must be certain or
have a substantial certainty that getting the desired information from
the former employee about their employer will result in a breach of
the former employee’s NDA.  If our lawyer were to be less than sub-
stantially certain of this result, we would understand their conduct as
reckless rather than intentional, and liability would not attach.  It is
difficult to imagine how a lawyer who has no knowledge that an actual
NDA binds the former employee could ever know or be substantially
certain that interference will occur.  This would seem to be a neces-
sary predicate for intentional interference.  At the same time, even
knowledge that there is an NDA does not mean that the lawyer neces-
sarily knows or is substantially certain that breach of the NDA will
result from the lawyer’s conversation with the former employee.  The
lawyer must know enough about the NDA to know that providing the
particular information sought certainly or substantially certainly will
result in a breach of the contract.
a. Actual Knowledge of the NDA Combined with Legal or
Factual Mistakes or Uncertainty
We begin by assuming that our lawyer has actual knowledge that
the former employee signed an NDA with their employer.  To help us
think through incidental intent as applied to interference with such a
known NDA, let us assume that there are two paradigmatic types of
NDAs: type A and type B.172  Our lawyer can make factual or legal
mistakes about these two types of NDAs or be uncertain about other
important facts related to these two types of NDAs.  What effects will
these possible states of mind have on incidental intent?
172. See Strassberg, supra note 29, section II.A (indicating that NDAs may or may not
have consideration depending on when they are entered into), section II.B (stat-
ing that NDAs may use varying language to define the scope of coverage), subsec-
tion II.B.4.a (stating that NDAs may also have different public interest impacts).
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First, let us consider when a lawyer in our scenario might not have
sufficient factual information to be certain or substantially certain
that questioning the former employee would cause a breach.  Suppose
the type A NDA, as a settled matter of law, covers the kind of informa-
tion the lawyer seeks, and the type B NDA, as a settled matter of law,
does not cover this kind of information.  Further, suppose that the
lawyer is correctly aware that there are these two types of agreements
and of their different legal effect.  Finally, suppose that the former
employee remembers that they signed something titled “non-disclo-
sure agreement” in connection with a severance package, but the law-
yer does not get to see a copy of the agreement, has no other facts
suggesting that the agreement signed was type A or type B, and has
no other information that makes the use of one type rather than the
other more probable in this situation.  Clearly, the lawyer could not be
viewed as knowing the breach of this agreement was certain, given the
facts available to them.
Could the lawyer instead be viewed as knowing that breach of this
agreement was substantially certain?  Without having some informa-
tion that made it substantially certain that the agreement signed was
type A, all the lawyer would know was that it was possible this was a
type A agreement and therefore that it was possible that questioning
would cause a breach.  Mere possibility, however, is not substantial
certainty.  If we keep in mind that this is really all about whether the
lawyer can be said to intend the breach, at least incidentally, you can-
not incidentally intend something by your conduct when the facts you
know only indicate that the result is possible but fail to indicate that
the result is probable.  Uncertainty about the facts cannot produce
certainty about the implications of those facts.  This conduct would
seem to be more reckless than intentional and therefore insufficient
for intentional interference liability.
Similarly, mistakes of fact can prevent an actor from concluding
that something is certain or substantially certain.  For example, sup-
pose in the previous example there was in fact a ninety percent actual
probability that any given NDA was a type A.  If the lawyer did not
have any facts that revealed this ninety percent probability, or had
facts that suggested to them there was only a ten percent probability
of a type A agreement, again it would seem impossible to say that the
lawyer was substantially certain that their conduct would result in
breach, even though objectively it might well be substantially certain
that their conduct would result in breach.  Similarly, if the lawyer was
told by the client that the NDA agreement signed was type B, but it
was really type A, the lawyer would not have facts which would allow
them to know that a breach was certain or substantially certain.
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Thus, either uncertainty about the facts or mistakes of fact will under-
mine incidental intent.173
What effect do mistakes or uncertainty about the legal conse-
quences of a particular agreement have on intent?  Suppose the law-
yer knows that a former employee has signed a type A NDA and the
lawyer believes that a type A NDA is void or voidable in this situation.
Can the lawyer be said to incidentally intend the breach of a contract
they believe to be void?  Both the Restatement and case law indicate
that a mistaken belief that a known contract is void or voidable will
not relieve the actor from knowledge that their actions will otherwise
interfere.174  This means we must assume the validity of an NDA
when evaluating intentionality.
A lawyer may also make a legal mistake about whether their con-
duct will cause a breach of the NDA.  Thus, the lawyer may know that
a former employee has signed a type A NDA and believe, based on the
particular information to be sought and the likely interpretation of the
language of the NDA, that questioning the former employee will not
cause a breach.  Alternatively, for good reasons that will become clear,
the lawyer may be uncertain as to how a court would interpret this
language.  However, mistake or uncertainty about interpretation of
contract language will not undermine intent:
“[I]t is not necessary that the actor appreciate the legal significance of the
facts giving rise to the contractual duty . . . .  If he knows those facts, he is
subject to liability even though he is mistaken as to their legal significance
and believes that the agreement is not legally binding or has a different legal
effect from what it is judicially held to have.”175
Thus, at least in circumstances when the lawyer knows sufficient facts
about the NDA to be able to correctly predict the legal effect of the
NDA, the substantial certainty of their interference will be judged as
if the legal effect had been correctly predicted.
This means that, unless a lawyer is certain as a matter of law that
a particular NDA known to bind the former employee will not cover
173. See EXDS, Inc. v. Devcon Constr., Inc., No. C05-0787 PVT., 2005 WL 2043020, at
*7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2005)  (finding that where defense counsel had insufficient
facts to realize that disclosed information might be confidential under a NDA
protecting confidential information, and facts known reasonably suggested infor-
mation was not confidential, counsel should not be disqualified).
174. Don King Prods., Inc., v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp. 741, 775–76 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (not-
ing that the law of intentional interference makes knowledge of the existence of
the contract rather than knowledge of the validity of the contract sufficient); see
also Ryan, Elliot & Co. v. Leggat, McCall & Warner, Inc., 396 N.E.2d 1009, 1012
(Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (finding no contract interference where defendant reasona-
bly did not know the terms of the agreement); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 766 cmt. i (1979) (indicating that a mistaken belief about legal effect of contract
provides no excuse).  This forces potential interferers to take the risk of being
wrong about the legal effect of the contract if they choose to interfere and the
contract turns out to be valid and binding.
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. i (1979).
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the information in question, the lawyer must evaluate their potential
tort liability, at least as to intent, on the assumption that the NDA
does cover this information and will be interfered with by their con-
duct.  This will create a specter of liability in some number of cases in
which the contract would actually not cover the information sought,
and this specter can only have the effect of chilling investigation of
cases or terrorizing lawyers who have engaged in such investigation
and are later threatened with disqualification.
b. Less Than Actual Knowledge
We understand that in an actual knowledge jurisdiction, incidental
intent to cause the breach of an NDA would seem to require actual
specific knowledge of the contract terms sufficient to allow the lawyer
to correctly predict that a court would find that the lawyer’s conduct
would interfere with this contract.  However, lawyers may not even
have actual knowledge of the existence of the NDA.  Thus, we must
consider the impact of being in a jurisdiction that allows for less-than-
actual knowledge of the existence of the contract to be sufficient.  Can
implied knowledge of an NDA, knowledge of an NDA that should have
been gained by reasonable inquiry, or knowledge of an NDA that just
should have been known produce certainty or substantial certainty of
interference with the NDA?
We already know that in an implied knowledge jurisdiction, a law-
yer who knows both that every employee of a particular employer is
required to sign an NDA and that the person they want to question is
a former employee of that particular employer would be viewed as
knowing that this employee signed an NDA, since it takes a deliberate
act of will to refuse to acknowledge the obvious implications of these
facts.  Consequently, the lawyer impliedly knows that there is an NDA
contract that exists that might be interfered with.  But we need more.
Can we have implied rather than actual knowledge of the specific de-
tails of the NDA?  Perhaps if a lawyer correctly knows that this em-
ployer uses a particular NDA with employees of this kind, we might
view them as deliberately refusing to acknowledge that fact, or at
least the high probability, that the employee has signed this particu-
lar kind of NDA.  Thus, we might be willing to find that they have
substantial certainty that this particular kind of NDA is involved, and
this would be sufficient to have substantial certainty that this NDA
would be breached.  Therefore, as long as there is sufficient back-
ground knowledge to allow implied knowledge of the crucial specific
terms of the contract, it appears that incidental intent can arise out of
implied knowledge as well as actual knowledge.  In the absence of this
background knowledge however, there would not be either actual or
implied knowledge of the terms of the NDA, and as we saw above,
uncertainty about these facts cannot produce substantial certainty of
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-4DR\NEB402.txt unknown Seq: 42 21-JUL-11 13:05
964 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:923
results that flow from these facts.  However, in some jurisdictions,
less-than-implied knowledge can be sufficient.  What happens to in-
tention in these jurisdictions?
Incidental intent is less compatible with the reasonable inquiry
standard than it may be with implied knowledge.  Consider a scenario
in which the existence of the NDA is actually known to the lawyer and
forum law triggers a duty to reasonably inquire as to the particulars of
the NDA.  This is most likely to occur when the lawyer is simply told
by the former employee that some NDA was signed.  There are a num-
ber of possible inquiries that might follow from this situation.  The
lawyer could ask the former employee if they have a copy of this agree-
ment and require them to provide it to the lawyer.  If the employee
does in fact have the NDA, but is not asked to provide it, we can imag-
ine that in a reasonable inquiry jurisdiction the lawyer would be found
to “know” the details of the NDA sufficient to determine that it did
cover this information.  However, are we entirely comfortable saying
that the lawyer is certain or substantially certain that interference
will occur, when in fact the lawyer is neither?  They have failed to act
in a way that would bring them to certainty or substantial certainty,
and under these circumstances, we are likely to say that failing to ask
for a copy from the former employee is choosing deliberate ignorance.
But this deliberate ignorance is more profound than the deliberate ig-
norance that exists when someone refuses to acknowledge the logical
or practical implications of what they do know.  Choosing uncertainty
here might be reprehensible, but it doesn’t come close to being
equivalent to certainty or even substantial certainty.  It is more than
reasonable to argue that mere reasonable inquiry knowledge cannot
produce incidental intent; indeed, it seems more accurate to say that
in this situation there is only recklessness or carelessness about the
possibility that particular actions might interfere with the contract.
Suppose, however, that the lawyer did ask the employee for a copy,
and the employee could not provide it, or perhaps the lawyer did not
ask, but the former employee would not have been able to provide it
anyway, as might also often be the case.  If the lawyer were to say, “I
cannot talk to you until you get a copy of the NDA from your em-
ployer,” we can imagine that the former employee, who is probably
just being accommodating in considering answering the lawyer’s infor-
mal questions at this point, might be unwilling to put themselves out
in this way.  The lawyer could offer to help the former employee get a
copy of the agreement by drafting a letter for them, or the lawyer
could attempt to contact the former employer to get some information
about this former employee’s NDA or their NDA agreements in gen-
eral.  Is all this encompassed in the duty of reasonable inquiry?
While we haven’t directly considered what is a reasonable inquiry
and what goes beyond reasonableness, we have seen that in the cases
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in which some duty of reasonable inquiry was found, the defendant
was either already in personal contact with the plaintiff (the former
employer in our scenario) and could easily have asked the plaintiff
about the agreement,176 or would have learned what they needed to
know by asking the breaching party, with whom they were certainly
in contact (the former employee in our scenario).177  Our lawyer, on
the other hand, may well have a breaching party who has no idea
what their obligations are, and a potential interfered-with party with
whom they have no established relationship or contact.  Furthermore,
one can easily imagine the response our lawyer will get from the for-
mer employer; they may well refuse to provide an actual copy of the
agreement and may just make the blanket claim that any questioning
the lawyer would like to do will be prohibited by the contract, whether
or not the agreement has actually been located and examined and
whether or not the former employer (or its lawyers) actually believes
the agreement would be found to cover this information.  Strategi-
cally, there is not much to lose on the part of the former employer in
making this strong claim.
Could a lawyer argue lack of substantial certainty regarding the
breach when their knowledge of the existence and terms of the con-
tract to be interfered only comes from such claims by the employer
and the agreement itself is never provided to the lawyer?  Two cases
say such an argument would not work, but they may be distinguisha-
ble.  In the first case, the relevant contract term was simple; either it
was an exclusive publishing contract or not, and the defendant re-
ceived a letter confirming that it was exclusive from both the plaintiff
publisher and the writer.178  In the second case, the relevant term, a
resale prohibition, was also fairly simple; the letter from the plaintiff
describing the resale prohibition was quite specific, and its credibility
was strongly supported by much additional evidence.179  However, as
will be demonstrated below, the legal scope of coverage by NDAs is
complicated enough that they may often be vulnerable to a number of
legal attacks.  Thus, we can imagine that, under the right circum-
stances, a blanket claim of coverage by the former employer could rea-
sonably be viewed as merely strategic rather than legally credible.  If
a lawyer is not given facts sufficient to make an accurate legal judg-
ment as to breach, but is asked instead to rely upon the self-interested
judgment of an adverse party, arguably the lawyer does not have sub-
stantial certainty that a breach will result.  So, in addition to not be-
176. See supra section I.C.
177. See supra section I.C.
178. B. Lewis Prods., Inc. v. Maya Angelou & Hallmark Cards, Inc., 01CIV.0530MBM,
2005 WL 1138474, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2005) (finding this was enough to
create a jury question as to the sufficiency of defendant’s knowledge).
179. D 56, Inc. v. Berry’s Inc., 955 F. Supp. 908, 916 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 1997) (finding
sufficient evidence of knowledge to create a jury question).
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ing quite sure whether a duty of reasonable inquiry triggered by
knowledge that some NDA was signed extends all the way to inquiry
to the former employer, we cannot be sure whether a suspiciously
strategic response from the employer lacking much in the way of de-
tails about the relevant terms would objectively provide the lawyer
with certainty or substantial certainty that the agreement would in
fact be breached.
The reasonable inquiry standard is even more incompatible with
incidental intent when the lawyer never actually comes to know of the
existence of an NDA between the former employer and employee, but
rather is legally credited with this knowledge because a reasonable
inquiry would have revealed the existence of such an agreement and
the lawyer’s failure to make this inquiry would seem to have been de-
liberate.  As we saw above, the case law does not provide much assis-
tance in determining what kind of factual knowledge might trigger
this duty to inquire as to existence of the contract, both because most
reasonable inquiry cases are about the content rather than the exis-
tence of the contract and because our facts are not easily analogized to
existing case law.  For the sake of having an example, however, per-
haps such a duty of inquiry would arise if the lawyer was told by a
colleague that the colleague had encountered one other person, for-
merly employed by the same employer and in a similar job, with an
NDA, but no further details about the NDA were able to be provided.
If the duty to inquire was triggered here, but the lawyer didn’t in-
quire, legally they would be credited with knowing the former em-
ployee they wish to question is a party to an NDA.  However, this
would not be enough in itself for incidental intent.  The lawyer would
need to be credited with knowledge that this NDA was certain or sub-
stantially certain to be breached by the questioning.
As will be argued in the second part of this Article,180 not every
NDA is breached by any question about the former employment.
Thus, is there a second duty to inquire, in which the lawyer should
have asked for a copy of the NDA they would have known about if they
had asked about its existence, or the lawyer should have contacted the
former employer about the NDA they might have known about if they
had asked the former employee about it?  We might ask whether inci-
dental intent built out of two layers of credited reasonable inquiry
knowledge rather than actual or even implied knowledge is really in-
tent at all, or mere negligence.181  Even worse, if the credited knowl-
edge were based on a “should have known” standard that was itself
180. Strassberg, supra note 29.
181. See Twitchell v. Nelson, 155 N.W. 621, 623 (Minn. 1915) (“There can be no ex-
press malice where the contractual relation is unknown to the alleged wrongdoer,
and it is a little difficult to imply it as a matter of legal inference when known
only constructively and from the fact that it is a matter of record.”).
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equivalent to mere negligence, we would certainly find it impossible to
describe any resulting interference as even incidentally intentional.
Yet, in those jurisdictions that have adopted a reasonable inquiry or
“should have known” less-than-actual knowledge standard as suffi-
cient for this intentional tort, without confronting the disturbing im-
plications of these knowledge standards upon intent, the possibility
exists that a lawyer with some minimal information and no actual
substantial certainty of interference could be credited with substantial
certainty and found to have incidental intent.
Overall, in considering whether a lawyer in our scenario could be
said to have intent, we have seen that only incidental intent is likely
to be present, that actual substantial certainty will require the lawyer
to have some as yet to be determined specific information about the
NDA, and that less-than-actual knowledge standards, which threaten
to undermine the intentional nature of the interference tort entirely,
may be applied in ways that could create tort liability for our lawyer.
The legal rabbit hole of less-than-actual-knowledge standards has re-
turned to complicate the analysis of what would even count as inten-
tional interference.  There is, however, one final tort element to
intentional interference—that the interference be adjudged improper
in some way—and this holds the most promise for letting the lawyer
in our scenario off the hook for liability.
E. Improper
The requirement that even intentional interference be improper182
before liability attaches reflects the law’s fundamental uneasiness
with holding a third party liable for the breach of contractual respon-
sibilities assumed by another.  Since the law already provides the
plaintiff with a contract remedy against the breaching party, it con-
cerns us to also provide the plaintiff with a tort cause of action against
a stranger to the contract for the very same damage with the addi-
tional and very real possibility of punitive damages not available in
contract.  There must be something tortiously wrongful about the
stranger’s own conduct to justify an additional remedy for the plaintiff
and this kind of liability for the defendant.  In addition, as much as we
may want to protect the plaintiff’s contract interests, the defendant’s
conduct may reflect an exercise of freedom that is even more impor-
tant to protect.
Valued conduct can be protected by tort law in one of two ways.  It
may fall under a well-developed privilege, in which case it will not be
improper.183  However, “[u]nlike other intentional torts such as inten-
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
183. Id. § 767 cmt. b (describing sections 768 through 774 as a non-exhaustive list of
some privileges that have been recognized for the interference tort).
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tional injury to person or property, or defamation, this branch of tort
law has not developed a crystallized set of definite rules as to the exis-
tence or non-existence of a privilege.”184  Thus, in many situations,
the propriety of defendant’s conduct can only be determined after an
individualized balancing of the harm to the plaintiff of the breach
against any positive value we find the interfering conduct to pro-
mote.185  This means that, unless the conduct falls within a recog-
nized privilege, there will be a great deal of uncertainty about the
possible impropriety of the interfering conduct; “[t]he decision there-




Although lawyers who advise their clients to breach a contract will
usually fall under the general privilege for those who have responsibil-
ity for the welfare of others,187 the lawyer in our scenario will not
have the benefit of this privilege because the breaching party is not
their client.  However, a lawyer’s conduct in our scenario could possi-
bly fall within a broader privilege to interfere by giving honest ad-
vice.188  While the former employee is not the lawyer’s client but
merely a potential witness, we can imagine that the lawyer might in
some cases provide some advice to the former employee as to whether
it is legally safe for the former employee to talk to the lawyer, given
the existence of the NDA.  Three conditions must be met, however, to
fall within this privilege: “(1) that advice be requested, (2) that the
advice given be within the scope of the request and (3) that the advice
be honest.”189  Ordinarily, the honest advice privilege will be a more
specific version of the lawyer’s privilege to cause a client to breach a
contract for their own welfare, as advice is the most usual method of




187. Id. § 770 (providing that no liability attaches as long as the interference is genu-
inely to protect the welfare of the other and improper means are not used); see,
e.g., L.A. Airways, Inc. v. Davis, 687 F.2d 321, 326 (9th Cir. 1982) (“An attorney
can claim the protection of the privilege to induce breach of contract, subject to its
qualifications, when he provides his advice in the course of his representation of a
client.”); Reynolds v. Schrock 142 P.3d 1062, 1068 (Or. 2006) (“[S]afeguarding the
lawyer–client relationship protects more than just an individual or entity in any
particular case or transaction; it is integral to the protection of the legal system
itself.”).
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772 (1979).
189. Id. § 772 cmt. c.
190. Id. §772 cmt. b (“[T]he lawyer . . . need[s] this protection for the performance of
their tasks.”).
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quested if the former employee asks the lawyer about the NDA, but
not if the lawyer volunteers such advice.191  However, the advice will
probably be within the scope of the request if the former employee
generally asks whether it is safe for them to talk to the lawyer without
expressly asking about the NDA.192
Finally, only good faith is required for the advice to be honest, al-
though reasonable grounds for the advice and reasonable diligence in
ascertaining the facts are important for determining good faith.193  In
our scenario, any judgment about the lawyer’s advice to the former
employee will take place after the court has already decided that the
NDA is in fact enforceable and covers the information in question.  If
the advice given was that the agreement did not cover this informa-
tion, was unenforceable, or both, clearly it will have been bad advice,
and the lawyer may have some liability to the former employee.  How-
ever, the fact that the advice was ultimately wrong does not necessa-
rily mean that it was not honest advice given in good faith.
However, a problem of a different kind may well arise from such
advice because the lawyer has a conflict of interest.  It will be in the
client’s interest to advise the former employee that it is safe to provide
information to the lawyer.  However, an independent lawyer might
well always advise a former employee that it is in their best interest to
not test whether the NDA applies.  Even if the NDA in question would
ultimately be ruled not to cover the information or to be voidable, the
aggravation and expense of being sued is typically worth avoiding,
particularly if there is no return to the former employee in taking this
risk.  This conflict may well not be consentable under Model Rule 1.7,
even assuming our advising lawyer actually advised the former em-
ployee of the conflict, fully informed them of the risks, and then asked
for and received consent.194  In the face of such a conflict, Model Rule
4.3 prohibits a lawyer from giving any legal advice to an unrepre-
sented former employee.195  Consequently, to come within this privi-
lege, there is a serious risk that the lawyer would have to act
191. Id. § 772 cmt. c.
192. Id. § 772 cmt. d (“The initial request . . . may be broad enough to embrace the
whole problem . . . .”).
193. Id. § 772 cmt. e.
194. This conflict would come under Model Rule 1.7(a)(2) and might not be consent-
able under Rule 1.7(b). Accord Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 159 F.R.D. 441,
445 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that plaintiff’s counsel should not discuss the valid-
ity of confidentiality agreements with former employees both because plaintiff
might not appropriately protect genuine trade secrets and privileged information
and because plaintiff’s counsel could be held liable to the former employee for
incorrect advice).
195. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2009) (“The lawyer shall not give legal
advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are
or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the cli-
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unethically.  It would not be unreasonable for a court to find that un-
ethical advice could not be given in good faith.196  Thus, in a version of
our scenario in which the lawyer’s advice to the former employee
causes the employee to speak freely to the lawyer, it is highly ques-
tionable that the lawyer would be immunized from liability as a result
of the advice.197  Furthermore, the unethical nature of the advice
would allow the court to find that the lawyer engaged in wrongful
means, which on its own almost certainly will result in a finding that
the interference was improper.198
b. Truthful Information
We saw earlier that even if a lawyer simply informed the former
employee who the client was and what the case was about, and the
former employee decided that they wanted to provide the information
because they thought the client should be helped, the lawyer may still
be said to have induced the breach.  However, the Restatement also
indicates that
[t]here is of course no liability for interference with a contract or with a pro-
spective contractual relation on the part of one who merely gives truthful in-
formation to another . . . even though the facts are marshaled in such a way
that they speak for themselves and the person to whom the information is
given immediately recognizes them as a reason for breaking his contract . . .
whether or not the information is requested.199
This privilege has been applied in cases where the inducement was a
truthful statement that a lawsuit had been filed,200 as well as other
truthful statements.201  A lawyer in our scenario might well do noth-
ent.”); see also Becker, supra note 19, at 901–02 (noting that contact with an un-
represented former employee can lead to a violation of Model Rule 4.3).
196. See Ramirez v. Selles, 784 P.2d 433, 436 (Or. 1989) (holding that a lawyer has no
competitive privilege in a client when it would be conflict of interest to represent
the client).
197. See Hamilton v. Greeleaf, 677 A.2d 525, 527–28 (Me. 1996) (providing that the
lawyer loses absolute litigation privilege for litigation communications if the law-
yer’s representation of the client violates conflict of interest rules).
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. c (1979) (suggesting that only in spe-
cial relationships, such as parental or custodial, could ordinarily wrongful means
ever be proper).
199. Id. § 767 cmt. b.
200. Thompson v. Paul, 657 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1116–17 (D. Ariz. 2009) (finding no
liability for law firm whose truthful statement that a lawsuit had been filed
against the terminated chief financial officer (CFO) resulted in a loss of new cli-
ents by the former CFO); Int’l City Mgmt. Ass’n Ret. Corp. v. Watkins, 726 F.
Supp. 1, 4, 6–7 (D.D.C. 1989) (finding no liability for employer whose truthful
statements that a lawsuit had been initiated against a discharged employee pre-
vented him from obtaining new employment).
201. E.g., Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 26 F.3d 1089, 1092–93 (11th Cir.
1994) (finding Rule 11 sanctions appropriate against plaintiff who filed inten-
tional interference suit against animal rights activist who had truthfully de-
scribed both a government report showing major deficiencies in the treatment of
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ing to induce the former employee to break their NDA other than to
truthfully identify their client, the matter on which they represent the
client, and describe litigation that has been or may be filed. Interna-
tional City202 makes it clear that the fact of a lawsuit is privileged, but
it is less clear from the case law how additional facts about the lawsuit
would be treated.203  Thus, there is some uncertainty about how a
description of the client’s claims in more detail would be treated.
Certainly, in the case of litigation that has already been initiated,
so long as the lawyer accurately reproduced the content of the com-
plaint and identified this content as the allegations of the complaint, it
would merely be a truthful description of the complaint, and the truth-
fulness of the allegations themselves would not be at issue.  If litiga-
tion had not yet been filed, however, the lawyer might have to describe
any statements about the potential defendant’s conduct as claims the
client has made to the lawyer to avoid putting the truthfulness of the
client’s claims at issue.  This could be problematic, however, as it
could constitute a waiver of attorney–client privilege as to statements
on this subject by the client.204
This privilege would also not cover any additional statements that
might be viewed as inducing the breach, and it might well take more
than the bare facts to get a former employee to cooperate.  The lawyer
may have to draw out both obvious and less obvious inferences for the
former employee.  For example, the lawyer might need to say, “Your
testimony supporting these allegations could help my client win this
case.”  This is not a mere statement of fact that can be true or false.  It
is a prediction of what might occur in the future, and it adds to the
animals by a commercial wildlife trader and a letter revoking the trader’s pri-
mate import license to a client of the trader); Masoni v. Bd. of Trade of S.F., 260
P.2d 205, 208 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953) (finding no liability for business associa-
tion whose truthful statement to creditors of a restaurant that one of the owners
had ample means to pay debts in full prevented the restaurant from obtaining
settlements from creditors for less than full payment); Liebe v. City Fin. Co.,  295
N.W.2d  16, 18–21 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (finding no liability when finance com-
pany employee who had secretly written book critical of finance industry and dis-
tributed flyers promoting book was terminated after another finance company
forwarded flyer to his employer and Better Business Bureau forwarded informa-
tion supplied by employee showing his connection to critical book); Allen v.
Safeway Stores Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 279–80 (Wyo. 1985) (finding no liability for a
state employee whose truthful account of statements made by grocery store em-
ployees resulted in the termination of their employment).
202. See generally Maura Strassberg, Privilege Can Be Abused: Exploring the Ethical
Obligation to Avoid Frivolous Claims of Privilege, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 413,
490 (2007).
203. For example, Thompson, 657 F. Supp. 2d 1113, fails to indicate whether the com-
munications went beyond the fact of the lawsuit to include allegations made in
the lawsuit.
204. Strassberg, supra note 202, at 490.
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moral pressure of the facts alone.205  The lawyer might also try to per-
suade the former employee to provide information by stating that the
former employer has probably behaved illegally toward many other
people and that by helping the client the former employee could help
stop the company from doing this to even more people in the future.
Again, these statements go beyond simple truthful information and
will not allow the privilege to be applied.
However, we do see, for the first time, a simple and definite guar-
antee for a lawyer in our scenario that their conduct will not be tor-
tious, unethical, or the basis for disqualification.  A lawyer may safely
induce a former employee to discuss matters covered by a valid NDA
so long as the inducement consists of nothing but truthful informa-
tion.  However, if statements exerting moral pressure are made that
cannot be viewed as truthful information, or inducements such as in-
demnity or advice are offered, the lawyer will not be able to take ad-
vantage of this privilege.  Once the safe harbor of truthful information
has been left, we must either find another privilege to cover the law-
yer’s conduct or take our chances that the jury will find the conduct
not improper in this particular case.206
c. Litigation Privilege
Immunizing litigators207 from liability for defamation arising out
of statements made in the course of litigation has long been recognized
as necessary to enable the zealous representation of clients by law-
205. While reviewing a draft of this Article, Dean Allan Vestal suggested a slightly
different version of this proposition: “With statements like yours, the odds of our
winning are enhanced.”  Whether this would fit under the exception as truthful
information about the probabilities, or whether probabilities would not be viewed
as the kind of information encompassed by the exception, is an open question.
206. Where no privilege is present, “the determination of whether the interference
was improper or not is ordinarily left to the jury,” in contrast to claims of privi-
leged conduct where the usual process is that the “court determines the circum-
stances under which a privilege exists and the jury determines what the actual
circumstances are.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. l (1979).
207. The same privilege also covers other essential participants in a judicial proceed-
ing, such as judges, parties, and witnesses.  Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65,
66 (Fla. 1992) (“ ‘This privilege extends to the protection of the judge, parties,
counsel and witnesses.’” (quoting Ange v. State, 123 So. 916, 917 (Fla. 1929))).
See generally Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 332–37 (1983) (detailing the history
of the recognition of the litigation privilege for judges, parties, and witnesses in
American law).
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yers208 and to avoid burdening the courts with secondary litigation.209
This “litigation privilege”210 has been defined as follows:
An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter con-
cerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial pro-
ceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a
judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation
to the proceeding.211
Almost all states provide such immunity212 from liability for defama-
tion.213  Many states also extend this absolute privilege214 to the tort
of intentional interference with contract,215 while other states extend
208. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978) (“Absolute immunity is thus neces-
sary to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective
functions without harassment or intimidation.”).
209. Kittler v. Eckberg, 535 N.W.2d 653, 657 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that a
public interest preventing “additional rounds” of tort litigation from adding to the
“large volume of litigation filed in the courts in recent years” provides further
justification for the “judicial privilege” (citing Rubin v. Green, 847 P.2d 1044,
1047–50 (Cal. 1993)). But see generally, Paul T. Hayden, Reconsidering the Liti-
gator’s Absolute Privilege to Defame, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 985, 1042–43 (1993) (argu-
ing that the widely accepted absolute litigation privilege should be replaced by a
qualified litigation privilege because it “harms the cause of justice as much as it
helps it”).
210. T. Leigh Anenson, Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability: Lessons for Litigation
Lawyers, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 915, 916 (2004).
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1979); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 57 (2000) (“A lawyer is absolutely privileged to pub-
lish matter concerning a nonclient if . . . the publication occurs in communica-
tions preliminary to a reasonably anticipated proceeding before a tribunal or in
the institution or during the course and as a part of such a proceeding.”).
212. Some states treat the privilege as providing immunity from suit, and even more
treat it as an affirmative defense.  Anenson, supra note 210, at 947 (“[T]he litiga-
tion privilege is used as a defense more often than it is used as a complete immu-
nity from suit.”).  The difference is that true immunity allows an immediate
appeal if the suit is not dismissed, while a court’s refusal to recognize an affirma-
tive defense is interlocutory and cannot be immediately appealed.  Douglas R.
Richmond, The Lawyer’s Litigation Privilege, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 281, 286
(2007).  However, as used here, the word “immunity” is not meant to convey more
than legal recognition of the privilege, whether as a complete defense or as an
immunity from suit.
213. But see Anenson, supra note 210, at 917 n.6 (noting that Georgia limits the abso-
lute immunity to pleadings and Louisiana provides only qualified immunity to
lawyers and witnesses).
214. While absolute privilege provides either an affirmative defense or immunity from
liability arising out of litigation communications even if actual malice can be
shown, it does not protect against an actual malicious prosecution or abuse of
process claim. See Collins v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 566 S.E.2d 595, 598 (W. Va.
2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 587 cmt. a (1979).
215. E.g., Pinto v. Int’l Set, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 306, 309 (D. Minn. 1986) (holding that
under both California and Minnesota law, absolute privilege protected an attor-
ney from intentional interference liability for letter threatening litigation); Agos-
tini v. Strycula, 42 Cal. Rptr. 314, 317 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (finding that,
under California law, the privilege covered liability of a witness for testimony
that induced breach of contract);  Buckhannon v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, Inc., 928
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only a qualified privilege216 for intentional interference with con-
tract.217  Assuming that the lawyer in our scenario would be acting in
good faith in questioning the former employee for a litigation purpose,
the difference between an absolute privilege and a qualified privilege
will not be significant.  However, it will be significant if the lawyer is
in one of the jurisdictions that do not extend the litigation privilege
beyond liability for defamation218 or have not yet decided whether to
P.2d 1331, 1335 (Colo. App. 1996) (finding that absolute privilege protected attor-
neys from intentional interference claims); Levin v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d
606, 608 (Fla. 1994) (holding on certified question that absolute immunity ex-
tended to claims against counsel of tortious interference with a business relation-
ship); Fisher v. Lint, 868 N.E.2d 161, 164, 170 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (holding that
absolute immunity protected a witness from intentional interference with advan-
tageous relations liability); Lone v. Brown, 489 A.2d 1192, 1197 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1985) (holding that absolute litigation privilege applies to a claim of
tortious interference with contractual relationship against a party filing a notice
of lis pendens); Pelagatti v. Cohen, 536 A.2d 1337, 1343 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)
(holding that absolute privilege protected attorneys from intentional interference
with contractual relations liability). But see Silver v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 598, 603
(3d Cir. 1990) (suggesting qualified immunity); Unarco Material Handling, Inc.,
v. Liberato, 317 S.W.3d 227, 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) (holding absolute privilege
from intentional interference liability for lawyer who induced a breach of confi-
dentiality agreement by former employee); Laub v. Pesikoff, 979 S.W.2d 686,
691–92 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (holding witnesses immune from liability for tortious
interference with contractual relationship); Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1258
(Utah 1997) (holding that absolute privilege protected a litigant whose defama-
tory statements interfered with a business relationship between an attorney and
his client from liability for intentional interference); Jeckle v. Crotty, 85 P.3d 931,
937–38 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (holding attorney immune from liability for inter-
ference with business relations); Clark v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864, 871 (W. Va.
2005) (holding that only malicious prosecution was an exception to the absolute
privilege in a case involving claims of both intentional interference and malicious
prosecution against an attorney).
216. Qualified privilege here means either an affirmative defense or immunity from
liability arising out of litigation communications unless actual malice or a lack of
good faith can be shown.
217. E.g., Silver, 894 F.2d at 603 (holding that Pennsylvania law would not apply ab-
solute privilege to intentional interference with prospective contractual relations
claim arising out of wrongful use of civil proceedings); Kahala Royal Corp. v.
Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 151 P.3d 732, 752 (Haw. 2007) (holding that
Hawaii law provides attorneys qualified immunity for tortious interference with
contractual relations provided that neither actual malice nor ultra vires conduct
is shown); Macke Laundry Serv. Ltd. P’ship v. Jetz Serv. Co., 931 S.W.2d 166,
182 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that Missouri law would immunize tortious in-
terference claims based on lawyer advice to client in the absence of improper
means, self-interest, or if not acting in good faith for interest of client); Mantia v.
Hanson, 79 P.3d 404,  414 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the privilege will not
immunize tortious interference claims when the interfering “conduct satisfies the
elements of wrongful initiation” of civil proceedings and malicious prosecution).
218. E.g., Zdeb v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 697 N.E.2d 425, 430 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (finding
that “Illinois courts have not extended the . . . [Restatement defamation litiga-
tion] privilege to claims for intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage”); Trau-Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 702 (Tenn.
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extend the privilege for intentional interference with contract
claims.219
Even in those jurisdictions that have already extended either an
absolute or qualified litigation privilege to claims of intentional inter-
ference with contract, there may remain some uncertainty about the
application of the privilege to the kind of interference involved in our
scenario.  To the extent most of these states have extended coverage of
the privilege to intentional interference, it has been because the inten-
tional interference with contract in question was caused by the defam-
atory nature of the litigation communications,220 and they recognized
that a “privilege which protected an individual from liability from def-
2002) (“Absent any claims for defamation, we decline to extend the privilege to
claims for intentional interference with business relationships.”). But see Am.
Cont’l v. Milberg, 884 F. Supp. 1388, 1396 (D. Ariz. 1995) (finding the litigation
privilege under Illinois law to extend to “any tort” liability for attorney litigation
statements, including tortious interference), aff’d, 103 F.3d 1524 (9th Cir. 1996),
rev’d on other grounds, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
219. E.g., Safeway Ins. Co., Inc. v. Guerrero, 106 P.3d 1020, 1023 n.16 (Ariz. 2005)
(refusing to decide whether litigation privilege protects attorneys from inten-
tional interference claims arising out of misrepresentations in settlement negoti-
ations when attorney’s conduct was not otherwise improper); Kirschstein v.
Haynes, 788 P.2d 941, 954  (Okla. 1990) (finding only that absolute litigation
privilege extends beyond defamation to intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress claims); Harris v. Riggenbach, 633 N.W. 2d 193, 195–96 (S.D. 2001) (same).
220. E.g., Agostini, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 315–16 (involving situation where youth worker
employment terminated after testimony that he engaged in corporal punish-
ment); Buckhannon, 928 P.2d at 1333 (addressing situation where disability pay-
ments terminated after litigation investigator told disability insurer that insured
was not disabled and had engaged in fraud); Smith v. Rosenstein, No. CV
950326698S, 2000 WL 965335, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 4, 2000) (holding that
absolutely privileged defamatory statements “cannot be the basis of a tortious
interference claim”); Fisher, 868 N.E.2d at 164–65 (addressing situation where
wages docked due to report of police misconduct); Mahoney v. Newgard, 729
N.W.2d 302, 310 (Minn. 2007) (holding that privilege extends to a claim of breach
of attorney–client privilege that does “sound in defamation” and refusing to reach
the question of whether the “privilege applies to claims not sounding in defama-
tion”); Lone, 489 A.2d 1195–96 (finding that immunity extended to tortious inter-
ference with contractual relation when complaint put “a different label” on
slander of title claim); Myers v. Pickering Firm, Inc., 959 S.W.2d 152, 162 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1997) (holding “the absolute privilege afforded a publication of false and
defamatory statements in the course of judicial proceedings applies to an action
for procurement or inducement of breach of contract based on those false and
defamatory statements”); Laub, 979 S.W.2d at 688 (finding that contracts to
transfer wife’s assets to husband not enforceable because affidavit alleged that
wife’s agreement was caused by abuse); accord Harris, 633 N.W.2d at 196 (al-
lowing immunity for negligence and intentional or negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress when claims simply put “a new label” on defamation claim); Price,
949 P.2d at 1258 (holding that defamatory statements that lead to intentional
interference with business relations are privileged for “all claims arising from the
same allegedly defamatory statements”); Clark, 624 S.E.2d at 866 (finding that
filing of medical negligence action had negative effect on physician’s relationship
with malpractice insurer).
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amation would be of little value if the individual were subject to liabil-
ity under a different theory of tort.”221  Thus, to the extent that the
potential witness in our scenario is induced by the lawyer to breach
their NDA with their former employee by making defamatory state-
ments, there would be a strong possibility222 in these jurisdictions
that the lawyer’s communications with the former employee would be
viewed as absolutely privileged.  Even factually true statements may
be covered by such a purely defamation-based interference privi-
lege,223 in addition to falling within the truthful information privilege
discussed above.
However, it might be that the lawyer induced the former employee
to talk by paying them money, by advising them that the NDA was
unenforceable or unlikely to be pursued by the former employer, or by
offering to indemnify or defend them from subsequent suit.  This kind
of conduct or communication causes the breach in a very different way
than defamatory or negative-but-truthful statements by providing in-
centives or removing disincentives to the breaching party rather than
impugning the reputation of the former employer.  Another form of
inducement might be by moral pressure generated by neither factu-
ally true statements nor defamatory statements, but rather by other
kinds of statements, such as “wouldn’t you like to be a hero here,” or
“this is the Christian thing to do.”  If a jurisdiction understands the
litigation privilege as meant only to protect participants in the litiga-
tion process from concerns about the truthfulness of their litigation-
related communications, then litigation communications that do not
make truth claims and are effective in other ways would not be privi-
leged in an intentional interference suit.
Only a few states have affirmatively found immunity from inten-
tional interference claims when the injurious nature of the litigation
communications or conduct has not arisen out of either the defama-
tory or the negative-but-true nature of the statements about the plain-
tiff.224  These jurisdictions have found that the need for “participants
221. Fisher, 868 N.E.2d at 170 (quoting Correllas v. Viveiros, 572 N.E.2d 7, 13 (Mass.
1991)); see also Laub, 979 S.W.2d at 690 (“[T]he privilege must extend beyond
defamation actions in order to ‘avoid the circumvention [of the policy behind the
privilege] by affording an almost equally unrestricted action under a different
label.’ ” (quoting Doe v. Blake, 809 F. Supp. 1020, 1028 (D. Conn. 1992))).
222. There are a few more wrinkles to the privilege which must be resolved before a
definitive conclusion as to privilege can be reached, such as when the communica-
tion took place relative to the commencement of the litigation. See infra notes
236–38 and accompanying text.
223. E.g., Rosenthal v. Irell, 135 Cal. Rptr. 121, 127–28 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that the privilege extends to liability arising out of truthful statements).
224. E.g., Lofton v. TLC Laser Eye Ctrs., Inc., No. Civ. CCB-00-1667, 2001 WL
121809, at *7 (D. Md. Feb. 8, 2001) (dismissing as privileged claims asserting
interference with contract by defamation, threats to sue, and attempts to enforce
a contract); Rusheen v. Cohen, 128 P.3d 713, 724 (Cal. 2006) (holding that “if the
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in litigation . . . to use their best judgment in prosecuting or defending
a lawsuit without fear of having to defend their actions in a subse-
quent civil action for misconduct”225 is the same regardless whether
the damage is caused by defamation or “other misconduct occurring
during the course of a judicial proceeding.”226  Most of these jurisdic-
tions have not had the opportunity to consider whether the precise
kind of misconduct involved in non-defamatory intentional interfer-
ence with contract deserves immunity.
However, a recent Tennessee case, Unarco Material Handling, Inc.
v. Liberato,227 addressed the issue of litigation privilege in precisely
our scenario.  A corporation’s former president was induced to breach
a confidentiality agreement by the lawyer for a client who suspected
that the corporation had fraudulently induced a settlement.228  Before
speaking to the lawyer, the former president insisted upon an indem-
nity agreement for his potential breach.229  The court found that the
lawyer’s conduct of negotiating the indemnity agreement and ques-
gravamen of the action is communicative, the litigation privilege extends to
noncommunicative acts that are necessarily related to the communicative con-
duct”); Rosenthal, 135 Cal. Rptr. at  127–28 (holding that attorney conduct urging
a settlement was privileged whether or not it contained statements that could be
said to be false and noting with approval prior cases holding privileged such simi-
lar conduct as filing a defective mechanic’s lien and making a settlement offer in
a threatening way); Clark v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864, 867, 869–70 (W. Va.
2005) (holding that a lawyer’s failure to ever talk to people ‘disclosed’ as planned
expert witnesses fell within the misconduct protected by the privilege); accord
Levin v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 607–08 (Fla. 1994)  (finding that disqualifi-
cation of attorney caused by bad faith certification that attorney would be called
as witness was protected from liability for tortious interference with business re-
lationship by litigation privilege); Kahala Royal Corp. v. Goodsill Anderson
Quinn & Stifel, 151 P.3d 732, 752 (Haw. 2007) (finding that lawyers’ conduct in
resisting a document discovery demand that then caused claimed breach of busi-
ness partner’s contractual obligation was protected by qualified litigation privi-
lege); Mantia v. Hanson, 79 P.3d 404, 412–13 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (describing with
apparent approval a prior holding that a false imprisonment claim arising out of
an arrest based on attorney conduct that led to a procedurally defective warrant
was subject to the litigation privilege (citing Hibner v. Creditors Collection Serv.
of Lincoln Cnty., Inc., 961 P.2d 898, 899–900 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)); Maynard v.
Caballero, 752 S.W.2d 719, 720–21 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (holding privileged from
a claim of intentional interference with contract one codefendant’s attorney’s con-
duct convincing another codefendant’s attorney that limited cross-examination of
prosecution witness would be strategically beneficial); Jeckle v. Crotty, 85 P.3d
931, 937–38 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that lawyer’s use of improperly leaked
patient names to contact patients for possible inclusion in ongoing class action
lawsuit was protected by absolute privilege).
225. Echevarria v. Cole, 950 So. 2d 380, 384 (Fla. 2007) (holding that litigation privi-
lege applies to liability under all common-law torts and statutory violations)
(quoting Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608).
226. Id. (emphasis added).
227. 317 S.W.3d 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).
228. Id. at 229.
229. Id.
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tioning the former president was absolutely privileged against a claim
of tortious interference with contract.230  The test set out by the court
for litigation privilege immunity from tortious interference with con-
tract requires that (1) the attorney be acting for a client or prospective
client in good faith, (2) the conduct be related to the subject matter of
the proposed litigation and there be a real nexus between the conduct
and the proposed litigation, and (3) the conduct not involve wrongful
means such as “fraud, trespass, threats, violence or other criminal
conduct.”231
At least a few courts have found that the litigation privilege should
not apply to misconduct in the form of a breach of contract.232  They
have reasoned that the public policy behind protecting litigation par-
ticipants from subsequent libel suits is not furthered by privileging
conduct that causes injury through disregard of contractual obliga-
tions and that the breaching party may also be said to have waived
the protection of the litigation privilege in the confidentiality con-
tract.233  Certainly, one might think that if the breach of a confidenti-
ality contract itself were not protected by the litigation privilege,
neither would an inducement to breach such a contract.  On the other
230. Id. at 238.  However, the court did suggest that this conduct violated Tennessee’s
version of Model Rule 4.2, which states: “In communicating with a current or
former agent or employee of an organization, a lawyer shall not solicit or assist in
the breach of any duty of confidentiality owed by the agent to the organization.”
TENN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 4 (2010), available at http://www.
tba.org/ethics/2011_TRPC.pdf.  In contrast, the Model Rules version of this com-
ment states: “In communicating with a current or former constituent of an organ-
ization a lawyer must not use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal
rights of the organization.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT. R. 4.2 cmt. 7
(2009).  In altering Model Rule 4.2 this way, Tennessee has chosen to find unethi-
cal conduct that its own courts immunize as essential to a lawyer’s representa-
tion.  This result is inconsistent. See infra section III.B.
231. Unarco Material Handling, Inc., v. Liberato, 317 S.W.3d 227, 238 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2010).
232. See Spectrum Creations, L.P. v. Carolyn Kinder Int’l, LLC, No. SA-05-CV-750-
XR, 2008 WL 416264, at *68–69 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2008) (holding that disclo-
sure of designs in violation of the confidentiality clause of a contract was not
privileged under Texas law because the cause of action was not defamation-based
and was not privileged under Florida law because the “disclosure of the cd of
designs was not in furtherance of either defendant’s defense of the lawsuit”); E. &
J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A., No. CV F 05-0101 AWI LJO, 2006 WL
1817097, at *7 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2006) (finding no litigation privilege for filing
suit in Ecuador when such filing was a breach of California forum selection and
choice of law contract provisions); Tulloch v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. Civ.A.
H-05-3583, 2006 WL 197009, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2006) (holding no privilege
when the attachment of a release to a complaint unnecessarily breached an obli-
gation of confidentiality contained in the release); Wentland v. Wass, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 109, 116 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (finding no litigation privilege where cause
of action was breach of contract of confidentiality by publicizing the confidential
information in a subsequent lawsuit between the contract parties).
233. Wentland, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 116.
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hand, some of these courts have also stated that “[w]here the grava-
men of the cause of action sounds in tort, not contract, the litigation
privilege applies.”234  Whether this would mean that intentional inter-
ference with contract—a tort cause of action involving a breach of a
non-contractual duty on the part of the interferer235—would be privi-
leged even though the underlying breach of contract would not be, re-
mains an open question.
Thus, while there is certainly the possibility that in some jurisdic-
tions a lawyer in our scenario would be privileged to use almost any
form of inducement to persuade a former employee to reveal informa-
tion covered by an NDA without concern that their actions could sub-
ject them to tort liability, the lack of precedent addressing privilege for
the non-defamatory injuries of contractual interference means that li-
ability remains a threat.
Another concern arises out of the fact that this kind of interference
might be likely to occur during informal pre-filing investigation.  Most
jurisdictions follow the Restatement in extending the privilege to ac-
tions that are necessary to but prior to the actual commencement of
the action.236  Some jurisdictions, however, limit the privilege to com-
234. Id. at 117.
235. 1A CAL. JUR. 3D Actions § 18 (2010) (“For purposes of determining whether a
claim against a government entity is based on tort or contract, if the claim is
based on breach of promise it is contractual, if based on breach of a noncontrac-
tual duty it is tortious, and if unclear, the action will be considered based on
contract rather than tort.”) (citing City of Dinuba v. Cnty. of Tulare, 40 Cal. Rptr.
3d. 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)).
236. E.g., Asay v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 594 F.2d 692, 697 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding
that Iowa would follow the Restatement’s extension of the privilege to “communi-
cations preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding” (citing RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) TORTS § 586 cmt. a (1979)); Finkelstein, Thompson & Loughran v.
Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc., 774 A.2d 332, 341–42  (D.C. 2001) (finding an at-
torney’s defamatory statements to potential client in potential shareholder’s ac-
tion were absolutely privileged); Buschel v. Metrocorp, 957 F. Supp. 595, 597–98
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding pre-litigation letter asserting contractual rights and
threatening court action if necessary was protected by absolute privilege under
Pennsylvania law); Trachsel v. Two Rivers Psychiatric Hosp., 883 F. Supp.
442–44 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (predicting that Missouri law would provide an absolute
privilege to a letter defaming one potential codefendant sent by potential plaintiff
to the other potential codefendant); W. Techs., Inc. v. Sverdrup & Parcel, Inc.,
739 P.2d 1318, 1321–22 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that defamatory report of
expert witness hired to determine cause of construction defects for possible litiga-
tion is absolutely privileged); Rubin v. Green, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 832  (Cal.
1993) (finding defamatory attorney communications to potential clients about
merits of proposed suit were absolutely privileged); Club Valencia Homeowner’s
Ass’n v. Valencia Assocs., 712 P.2d 1024, 1028 (Colo. App. 1985) (stating that
“communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding” are covered by
the absolute privilege (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1979));
Smith v. Rosenstein & Barnes, No. CV 950326698S, 2000 WL 965335, at *3
(Conn. Super. Ct. May 4, 2000) (holding that absolute privilege covers prelitiga-
tion communications); Smith v. Idexx Labs., Inc., No. CIV.A. CV-99-493, 2000 WL
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munications or conduct during the course of the litigation237 on the
ground that the privileged participants are only under the supervision
of the court once proceedings have begun, and it is this supervision
33675700, at *2 (Super. Ct. Me. Jan. 11, 2000) (holding that absolute privilege
should cover defamatory statements in potential defendant’s response to poten-
tial plaintiff’s demand letter); Arundel Corp. v. Green, 540 A.2d 815, 818–19 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (attorney letter seeking warning and injury information
from purchasers of crushed rock who might be witnesses in contemplated asbes-
tos litigation was absolutely privileged); Sriberg v. Raymond, 345 N.E.2d 882,
884 (Mass. 1976) (holding that absolute privilege covers relevant attorney com-
munications preliminary to litigation); Kittler v. Eckberg, 535 N.W.2d 653, 657
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that defamatory attorney letter soliciting addi-
tional clients for potential shareholder suit was absolutely privileged); Fink v.
Oshins, 49 P.3d 640, 644 (Nev. 2002) (finding that absolute privilege applies to
attorney statements defaming trustee made prior to proceedings to remove trus-
tee were commenced); Provencher v. Buzzell-Plourde Assocs., 711 A.2d 251, 256
(N.H. 1998) (“We join those courts which have concluded that pertinent pre-liti-
gation communications between a witness and a litigant or attorney are abso-
lutely privileged from civil liability if litigation was contemplated in good faith
and under serious consideration.”); Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 289–90
(N.J. 1995) (finding that absolute privilege protected attorney-hired investigators
who defamed potential plaintiff in interviews with prospective witnesses prior to
commencement of litigation); Harris v. NCNB Nat’l Bank of N.C., 355 S.E.2d 838,
842 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (finding an attorney absolutely privileged to send pro-
posed complaint containing defamatory statements to attorney representing ad-
verse party in a dispute); Samson Inv. Co. v. Chevaillier, 988 P.2d 327, 331 (Okla.
1999) (finding defamatory allegations made in an attorney letter to potential cli-
ents regarding possible litigation were absolutely privileged); Chard v. Galton,
559 P.2d 1280, 1282–83 (Or. 1977) (finding attorney’s defamatory pre-litigation
statements seeking settlement from insurer of potential defendant were abso-
lutely privileged); Crowell v. Herring, 392 S.E.2d 464, 468 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992)
(finding that absolute privilege covers “pre-investigation affidavit by an eventual
witness”); Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v, Stewart, Estes, & Donnell, 232 S.W.3d.
18, 24 (Tenn. 2007) (holding defamatory communications in advertisements solic-
iting prospective clients for contemplated class action absolutely privileged);
Krishnan v. Law Offices of Preston Henrichson, P.C., 83 S.W.3d 295, 302 (Tex.
App. 2002) (finding that pre-filing attorney notice of claim letter to potential de-
fendant defaming another potential defendant was absolutely privileged); Krouse
v. Brower, 20 P.3d 895, 898–99 (Utah 2001) (finding attorney demand letter
made prior to commencement of litigation was covered by absolute privilege); Col-
lins v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 566 S.E.2d 595, 603 (W. Va. 2002) (holding that abso-
lute privilege applied to defamatory statements about third parties in employer’s
response to employee demand letter).
237. E.g., Kurczaba v. Pollock, 742 N.E.2d 425, 438–39 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (finding
that, since litigation privilege limited to publication during the course of judicial
proceeding, publication of amended complaint prior to grant of leave to file by
court is not privileged); Timmis v. Bennett, 89 N.W.2d 748, 752 (Mich. 1958)
(“The mere fact that defendant contemplated starting an action for damages on
behalf of Mrs. Roblyer involving the acts of plaintiff and other police officers of
the city of Kalamazoo does not bring the situation within the generally recog-
nized rule.”); Park Knoll Assocs. v. Schmidt, 451 N.E.2d 182, 184–85 (N.Y. 1983)
(“A witness is immune from suit for defamatory remarks pertinent to a judicial
proceeding . . . but not for those made before the proceeding commences.”).
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that ensures that otherwise tortious behavior will be both deterred
and penalized.238  In these jurisdictions, pre-litigation investigation
involving conversations with former employees would potentially sub-
ject attorneys to liability, while the same conversations taking place
after the commencement of litigation would have the possibility of
immunity.
A further limitation on the privilege that could be relevant to our
scenario is that the statements or conduct complained of must have
“some relation to the proceeding.”239  This means that both the ends
and means of the conduct must be appropriately related to the con-
templated litigation.240  There is considerable agreement that fact in-
vestigation and witness interviews are essential litigation
functions,241 and many jurisdictions have recognized that an absolute
privilege protects attorney conduct and communications relevant to
these functions.242  The requirement that the specific content of the
238. Kurczaba, 742 N.E.2d at 441 (“[A]n absolute privilege is allowed only in ‘situa-
tions in which authorities have the power to discipline as well as strike from the
record statements which exceed the bounds of permissible conduct.’” (quoting
Demopolis v. Peoples Nat’l Bank of Wash., 796 P.2d 426, 430 (Wash. Ct. App.
1990))).
239. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 58 (1979).
240. Anenson, supra note 210, at 935 (“In determining what conduct is entitled to the
protection of the litigation privilege, courts examine not only the purpose of the
conduct, but also the method employed to achieve that goal.”).
241. E.g., Hawkins, 661 A.2d at 290 (“Pretrial investigation is ‘necessary to a thorough
and searching investigation of the truth,’ . . .  and, therefore, essential to the
achievement of the objects of litigation.” (citation omitted)); Anenson, supra note
210, at 935 (“Some of the legitimate purposes acknowledged by the courts are
statements or conduct designed to gather evidence.”).
242. E.g., Hoover v. Van Stone, 540 F. Supp. 1118, 1123–24 (D. Del. 1982) (finding
that attorney contacts with persons who reasonably were potential witnesses
were absolutely privileged); Selby v. Burgess, 712 S.W.2d 898,  900 (Ark. 1986)
(extending absolute privilege to “communications made during investigation of a
claim”); Ascherman v. Natanson, 100 Cal. Rptr. 656, 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)
(“The absolute privilege in both judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings extends to
preliminary conversations and interviews between a prospective witness and an
attorney if they are some way related to or connected with a pending or contem-
plated action.”); Stucchio v. Tincher, 726 So. 2d 372, 373 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(finding absolute privilege covers attorney interview with “potential witness in
preparation for trial”); Robinson v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,  49 N.W.2d 521,
527 (Iowa 1953) (finding that absolute privilege “has equal application to a situa-
tion where an attorney is conferring with a prospective witness”); Hawkins, 661
A.2d at 290 (holding that absolute privilege should extend to the relevant state-
ments of investigators made in the course of pretrial discovery but also finding
that an investigator’s suggestion of infidelity may not have been relevant to the
litigation); Kirshstein v. Haynes, 788 P.2d 941, 953–54 (Okl. 1990) (holding that
potential litigant who acted as a lawyer would in showing defamatory affidavit to
persons who had reason to know the truth or falsity of its contents was entitled to
absolute privilege); Moses v. McWilliams, 549 A.2d 950, 959–60 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988) (holding that subsequent treating physician’s provision of confidential in-
formation to lawyer for hospital in malpractice case during informal ex parte dis-
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defamatory communication also be relevant to the litigation ensures
that extraneous allegations are not immunized.243  In Unarco, the
only case to consider this issue in the context of our scenario, the court
required that the lawyer’s breach inducing conduct be “related to the
subject matter of proposed litigation [and that there be] a real nexus
between the attorney’s conduct and litigation under consideration.”244
This requirement would not seem to pose a problem in our scenario as
long as the lawyer did not push the disclosure beyond potentially rele-
vant material.
Finally, some jurisdictions have provided only a qualified privilege
for defamatory attorney statements made during informal discovery
to people who are otherwise unconnected to the proceedings, such as
witnesses.245  At least one jurisdiction appears to provide no immu-
covery would be absolutely privileged); Russell v. Clark, 620 S.W.2d 865, 868
(Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (extending “absolute privilege to out-of-court communica-
tions made by attorneys preliminary to a judicial proceeding, or in connection
therewith”); accord W. Techs. Inc. v. Sverdrup & Parcel, Inc., 739 P.2d 1318,
1321–22 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that absolute privilege covered a potential
witness’s report to client considering litigation); Myers v. Pickering Firm, Inc.,
959 S.W.2d 152, 161 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding an expert report relevant to
liability in pending litigation absolutely privileged).  See generally Tanguay v.
Asen, 722 A.2d 49, 50 (Me. 1998) (holding that there is at least a “qualified privi-
lege of counsel to inquire and develop evidence relevant to the proceeding” and
refusing to decide whether the privilege is qualified or absolute).
243. E.g., Hoover, 540 F. Supp. at 1121 (noting that the absolute privilege is subject
only to the limitation that “the privileged statements must be relevant or perti-
nent to the case”); Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180, 202
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that departing law firm member’s persuasion of a
litigation client to leave with them was unrelated to the litigation and therefore
not privileged in an interference with contractual relations action brought
against them by the law firm); Hawkins, 661 A.2d at 292 (“The litigation privilege
is not, however, a license to defame.”).
244. Unarco Material Handling, Inc. v. Liberto, 317 S.W.3d 227, 238 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2010) (finding both sufficient relation and nexus for lawyer’s conduct to grant
summary dismissal of the intentional interference claim).
245. E.g., Burzynski v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 1063, 1068 (5th Cir. 1992) (find-
ing under Texas law that a mass mailing to third parties whose “relationship to
the litigation was hypothetical at best” and which contained more defamatory
information than needed for investigatory purposes does not bear a sufficient re-
lationship to the proceeding to justify absolute immunity (citation omitted));
Schulman v. Anderson Russell Kill & Olick, P.C., 458 N.Y.S.2d 448, 453–54 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1982) (“[T]he absolute privilege protecting statements in the course of
judicial proceedings does not apply to lawyers’ informal communications designed
to gather information or to identify potential witnesses. . . .  [H]owever . . . attor-
neys’ statements reasonably related to informal discovery do deserve the more
limited protection of qualified privilege.”); accord Twelker v. Shannon & Wilson,
Inc., 564 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Wash. 1977) (holding that only qualified rather than
absolute privilege was available to an expert’s report to an insurer concerned
about an insured’s possible exposure to liability); see also Kahala Royal Corp. v.
Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 151 P.3d 732, 752 (Haw. 2007) (finding that
lawyers’ management of inspection and review of books fell within Hawaii’s gen-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-4DR\NEB402.txt unknown Seq: 61 21-JUL-11 13:05
2011] AN ETHICAL RABBIT HOLE 983
nity for communications with potential or actual witnesses.246  As the
former employees our lawyer would be talking with are likely to be no
more than witnesses, there are some jurisdictions in which we can be
sure that our lawyer will not be able to assert the litigation privilege.
Thus, we have one jurisdiction, Tennessee, in which the litigation
privilege will definitely be available to prevent liability in our scena-
rio.  In a number of other jurisdictions the litigation privilege will defi-
nitely not be available because the former employee is only a witness
or if the inducement occurs pre-filing.  In jurisdictions where these
factors are not a problem, the application of the privilege is an open
question, depending on how far the jurisdiction is willing to expand
the privilege past defamation-based conduct.
2. Not Improper
If interfering conduct cannot fall within one of these privileges, it is
necessary to examine the competing values present in the particular
case.  This requires the consideration of at least seven distinct factors:
(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, (b) the actor’s motive, (c) the interests of
the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes, (d) the interests sought to
be advanced by the actor, (e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of
action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other, (f) the proximity
or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference and (g) the relations
between the parties.247
Each of these factors, and their possible application to our scenario,
will be addressed below.  However, it should already be apparent that
the very complexity of this analysis, and the unpredictability of the
weighing which follows, particularly in the novel context posed by our
scenario, makes this step of the analysis its own little rabbit hole,
which adds yet another layer of unpredictability to this tort analysis.
a. Nature of the Actor’s Conduct
The significance of this factor is greatest when the actor’s interfer-
ing conduct falls within an independent tort, such as violence, fraud,
or duress; however, all that can be said is that ordinarily the use of
such means will make interference improper.248  In the right circum-
erally qualified litigation privilege for intentional interference with contractual
relations claims).
246. See Kurczaba v. Pollock, 742 N.E.2d 425, 440–41 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (noting that
the litigation privilege for attorneys in Illinois has not been extended beyond
communications with opposing counsel, co-counsel, and clients).
247. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979).  Further, the Restatement pro-
vides, “This Section states the important factors to be weighed against each other
and balanced in arriving at a judgment; but it does not exhaust the list of possible
factors.” Id. § 767 cmt. b.
248. Id. § 767 cmt. c (“Thus physical violence, fraudulent misrepresentation and
threats of illegal conduct are ordinarily wrongful means and subject their user to
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stances, even violence will not be viewed as improper, as for example
when a parent uses corporal punishment to stop a child from engaging
in activities that are deemed bad for the child.249  Although we would
not expect the lawyer to engage in any such independently tortious
conduct to induce the former employee to respond to some questions,
we must also consider whether the lawyer’s conduct might be im-
proper because it is unethical.250
We know that a possible violation of Model Rule 4.4, which prohib-
its the “use of methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal
rights of such a person,”251 is at stake in this conduct.   However, we
cannot know if questioning a former employee with an NDA is unethi-
cal under Model Rule 4.4 until it has been independently determined
that it violates the legal rights of the former employer, as provided by
tort law.  Since this conduct can only be unethical if it is first improper
under the law of intentional interference, it cannot, therefore, be im-
proper because it is unethical under Model Rule 4.4.  Ethical viola-
tions that are independent of the tort, however, would be relevant.
Potential ethical violations in this context could include, as discussed
above, legal advice to a former employee that would be ethically im-
proper under Model Rules 1.7 and 4.3.252  Other ethical violations that
could arise in this context might include solicitation of a prospective
client in violation of Model Rule 7.3, conduct that induced favorable
testimony from a witness in violation of Model Rule 3.4, or inquiries
into attorney–client privileged material in violation of a different as-
pect of Model Rule 4.4.253
Assuming these ethical violations were avoided, and there is no
reason to think they are unavoidable in this situation, there is still the
possibility that the conduct could be improper as a result of violating a
practice—if there was a practice of not questioning employees with
NDAs that was followed by lawyers in the particular locality or area of
practice.  However, there is no reason to believe that such a practice
has actually been established within any community of lawyers.
liability even though he is free to accomplish the same result by more suitable
means.”).
249. Id. (noting that beating your own child to prevent them from gambling is not
improper).
250. Id. (stating that “violation of recognized ethical code . . . or of established customs
or practices” are potentially relevant to the impropriety of the interference); see
also Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Cerskoff v. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Pa.
1978) (finding solicitation of clients in violation of  the Pennsylvania Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility improper because of unethical means of inducement).
251. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 4.4 (2009).
252. See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text.
253. See also Unarco Material Handling, Inc. v. Liberto, 317 S.W.3d 227, 239 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2010) (noting that inducing a breach of confidentiality agreement is un-
ethical under Tennessee’s version of Model Rule 4.2).
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Case law suggests that unfair conduct can also make interference
improper.  Thus, one particular kind of inducement—offering to in-
demnify the breaching party for the breach—may well be improper if
it is viewed as unfair.  While there is disagreement about whether this
kind of inducement is improper in cases involving only prospective
contractual relations,254 there is more consistent case law holding
that this is an improper tactic when applied to existing contracts for
the purpose of gaining commercial advantage.255  However, in
Unarco, where the purpose of inducing the breach was to gain infor-
mation for possible litigation, the court found negotiation of an indem-
nity agreement demanded by the former employee privileged because,
among other things, it did not involve “wrongful means,”256 which it
described as including, “inter alia, fraud, trespass, threats, violence,
or other criminal conduct.”257
Finally, in the absence of tortious, unethical, or unfair behavior,
minor aspects of the actor’s conduct, such as whether they were acting
alone or in concert, whether the inducement was presented personally
or more remotely, and whether the contact between them was initi-
ated by the actor or the breaching party, could become relevant to “tip
the scales” in a close case.258  It is possible to imagine that the particu-
lar circumstances by which a lawyer comes into contact with a former
employee could involve these possibilities.  The lawyer could be work-
ing with lawyers representing other plaintiffs, could contact the for-
mer employee by telephone or mail, and could have initiated the
contact or have been sought out by the former employee.  Thus, all
that can be said is factors able to tip the scales toward liability may or
may not be present.
b. The Actor’s Motive
The actor’s motive in interfering could be simply to bring about the
interference, or there could be a distinctly different motive.  The Re-
254. Compare Leonard Duckworth, Inc. v. Michael L. Field & Co., 516 F.2d 952, 958
(5th Cir. 1975) (finding improper interference with real estate commission), with
PMC, Inc. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 877, 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(finding offer of indemnity agreement not improper).
255. Edward Vantine Studios, Inc. v. Fraternal Composite Serv., Inc., 373 N.W.2d
512, 515 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (“[D]efendant’s interference was improper to the
extent that it agreed to indemnify the houses for any legal costs or fees resulting
from their breach of plaintiff’s contracts.”); Melo-Tone Vending, Inc. v. Sherry,
Inc., 656 N.E.2d 312, 315 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (subsidizing legal defense made
interference improper); Downey v. United Weatherproofing, Inc., 253 S.W.2d 976,
982 (Mo. 1953) (“[A]ttempting to induce plaintiffs’ customers to breach their ex-
isting contracts by offering to indemnify such customers against liability for the
breach, states conduct which is wrongful . . . .”).
256. Unarco, 317 S.W.3d at 238.
257. Id.
258. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. c (1979).
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statement places the presence or absence of the specific desire to bring
about the interference in the “actor’s motive” factor259 and places the
presence or absence of any other possible motives in the fourth factor,
“the interests sought to be advanced by the actor.”260  In the discus-
sion of the intentional nature of a lawyer’s interference in this scena-
rio, we previously concluded that a lawyer questioning a former
employee would not be doing this for the purpose of interfering with
the NDA and would not desire this result to occur.  Rather, we decided
that at most the lawyer could have incidental intent, in that they
might know that breach of this contract would certainly or substan-
tially certainly result.  The Restatement indicates that where intent to
interfere is only incidental, “the factor of motive carries little weight
toward producing a determination that the interference was im-
proper.”261  Thus, on this factor, there will be nothing to suggest im-
proper interference in our scenario.
c. The Interests of the Other with Which the Actor’s Conduct
Interferes
Not all contractual interests are created equal: “Some contractual
interests receive greater protection [from interference] than
others.”262  Most importantly, this factor distinguishes the lesser
harm of interference with prospective contractual relations from the
greater harm of interference with existing contractual relations.263
Competition can trump an interest in prospective contractual rela-
tions as long as wrongful means are not used,264 while competitive
interference with an existing contract will create liability even if less
than wrongful means are used.265  As we have seen, some jurisdic-
tions will treat voidable contracts as mere prospective contractual re-
lations, while others view them as no different than fully enforceable
contracts, at least until such time as the affected party seeks to void
them.266  If an NDA were to be voidable in one of the former jurisdic-
tions, and the lawyer’s interest in the information was seen as compet-
itive with the former employer’s interest, then the absence of the use
of any wrongful means, such as violence, fraud, criminal or civil prose-
259. Id. § 767 cmt. d.
260. Id. § 767(d); see also id. § 767 cmt. f (noting the importance of the interest the
actor intends to promote).
261. Id. § 767 cmt. d.
262. Id. § 767 cmt. e.
263. Id.
264. Id. § 768(b) (“One who intentionally causes a third person not to enter into a
prospective contractual relation with another who is his competitor . . . does not
interfere improperly with the other’s relation if . . . the actor does not employ
wrongful means.”).
265. See id. § 767 cmt. e.
266. See supra section I.A.
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cution,267 would strongly suggest that no interference liability could
arise.  If the lawyer’s interest in the information was not seen as com-
petitive, but rather as arising out of another motive or interest, then
the court would have to judge whether that interest outweighs the in-
terest in a prospective contractual relationship, as is discussed further
in the next section.
We have also seen that no harm whatsoever is considered to arise
from interference with void contracts, such as those that are illegal or
violate public policy, at least as long as only “appropriate means” are
used.268  This last caveat is somewhat puzzling as it would seem that
the lack of a protectable contract interest should make the means used
irrelevant.  Indeed, arguably we should not even be considering the
propriety of the interference when there is no interference at all.  If a
threat of violence—an illegal means—was used to get someone not to
perform a contract that was illegal to begin with, there might be liabil-
ity for assault, but there should not be liability for interference.  How-
ever, following the language of the Restatement, we can at least safely
conclude that interference with a void NDA in our scenario should not
be a concern as long as inappropriate means were not used.  Although
the Restatement fails to explain what “appropriate means” are, it
would seem that if the means of inducement likely to be used by a
lawyer—ranging from a promise to defend, to indemnify, to do both
with any claim of breach of the NDA, or to moral persuasion that help-
ing the plaintiff is the right thing to do—would not be sufficiently
“wrongful” for interference with prospective contract relationships,
such means should not be “inappropriate” for interference with a void
contract, as this is of even less value than a prospective contractual
relationship.
d. The Interests Sought to be Advanced by the Actor
i. Improper Interests: Malicious and Economic
Identification of the interest the actor sought to promote through
the interference can, in some cases, quickly reveal that interference is
improper.  Interference with a contract that is motivated out of ani-
mosity and a desire to hurt the other has no value and will always
therefore be improper.269  A desire to improve one’s own economic po-
sition is recognized as important and enough to justify interference
with prospective contractual relations, but it is insufficient to justify
interference with another’s existing contractual relationship.270  In
our scenario, the lawyer is acting on behalf of a client who is either
267. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 cmt. e (1979).
268. See id. § 774.
269. Id. § 767 cmt. f.
270. Id.
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considering litigation or is in the early stages of initiated litigation.
Assuming that our lawyer is otherwise ethical and has not pursued
litigation in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure271 and Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,272 it
should not be possible to say that the interference was solely for the
purpose of “gratifying . . .  feeling[s] of ill will.”273
However, should a lawyer who pursues litigation on behalf of a
paying client,274 because it advances the interests of the client, be
seen as acting simply to improve their own economic position?  Nor-
mally in this tort, improving one’s own economic position occurs by the
interfering actor diverting an economic opportunity from another for
the actor’s direct economic benefit.  There is no such direct economic
benefit to the lawyer for this interference.  However, if the interfer-
ence helps make the litigation successful and therefore more finan-
cially remunerative for the lawyer, then, particularly in litigation
involving a contingency fee, we could match the lawyer’s desire to get
a large verdict against the former employer’s desire to avoid the eco-
nomic harm that release of information may cause.  If such an eco-
nomic motive were all we were willing to credit the lawyer with, then
it is pretty clear that this motive would not help the lawyer avoid lia-
bility.275  However, courts are unwilling to “conclude that lawyers
have an improper motive simply because they seek to increase their
fees by maximizing an award for a client.”276
ii. Proper Interests: Public Interest and the Rule of Law
Most lawyers should be able to argue that the motivation for their
interference was serving the public interest.  Some litigation will have
a specific public interest component because of the specific rights en-
forced.  Even litigation that serves only to vindicate private rights
with no immediate public ramifications can be seen to serve the public
271. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (requiring attorneys to sign pleadings and other filings,
thereby representing that the claims therein are non-frivolous).
272. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2009) (“A lawyer shall not bring . . . a
proceeding . . . unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not
frivolous.”).
273. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. f (1979).
274. This would include payment by someone to represent the client or any situation
in which the lawyer gained some personal economic benefit as an intended, albeit
indirect, consequence of representation.
275. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. f (1979) (“If the interest of the other
has been already consolidated into the binding legal obligation of a contract, how-
ever, that interest will normally outweigh the actor’s own interest in taking that
established right from him.”).
276. E.g., Safeway Ins. Co. v.  Guerrero, 106 P.3d 1020, 1027 (Ariz. 2005) (finding no
improper motive by lawyer merely because Morris agreement would increase his
contingency fee).
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interest in maintaining the rule of law.277  How would we know
whether contemplated or initiated litigation involves a specific public
interest?  Case law has found a public interest in interfering with con-
tracts that threaten public safety,278 may involve illegal public spend-
ing,279 place patients in dangerous nursing homes,280 give privileges
to doctors believed to be incompetent,281 or employ sexual harass-
ers.282  It seems likely that many other types of lawsuits could be
viewed as involving a public interest, but again this inserts another
level of unpredictability.
Whether a specific public interest can be connected to our litigation
or merely the general public interest in maintaining the rule of law,
the Restatement suggests that a careful evaluation must take place to
ensure the interference is not still improper.
[R]elevant questions in determining whether his interference is improper are:
whether the practices are actually being used by the other, whether the actor
actually believes that the practices are prejudicial to the public interest,
whether his belief is reasonable, whether he is acting in good faith for the
protection of the public interest, whether the contractual relation involved is
incident or foreign to the continuance of the practices and whether the actor
employs wrongful means to accomplish the result.283
We can consider the application of these questions to two versions of
our scenario, one in which the litigation involves the general public
interest in maintaining the rule of law and the other in which the liti-
gation involves a specific public interest.  As the public would not
seem to be interested in a fence dispute between neighbors beyond a
general interest in assuring that rights are enforced in a peaceable
manner, this will be the general public interest version of our scena-
rio.  The second version will be a discrimination lawsuit, as this has
277. See Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc. v. Wells, 839 F.2d 155, 159 (3d
Cir. 1988) (“There can be no tortious action or impropriety when private citizens
or public officials exercise their rights to notify the appropriate agencies or mobil-
ize public opinion about a serious violation of the law.”).
278. Stratford Materials Corp. v. Jones, 499 N.Y.S.2d 172, 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
(finding that unapproved contracts to supply manholes for public works project
properly interfered with to protect public safety and accountability).
279. Bledsoe v. Watson, 106 Cal. Rptr. 197, 198–99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that
interference with contract illegally funded with taxpayer funds was in the public
interest).
280. Brownsville, 839 F.2d at 159 (“Patently, the revocation of Brownsville’s license
directed by the state court is dispositive of the propriety of defendants’ actions.”).
281. Stitzell v. York Mem’l Osteopathic Hosp., 754 F. Supp. 1061, 1068 (M.D. Pa.
1991) (finding that legislation protecting peer review demonstrated value in criti-
cal evaluation by physician colleagues).
282. Miller v. Servicemaster by Rees, 851 P.2d 143, 146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (“[T]here
is a strong public policy to protect a worker’s right to report alleged sexual har-
assment.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. f (1979) (noting
that the disclosure of racial or sexual discrimination in employment may promote
the actor’s interest as well as the public interest).
283. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. f (1979).
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been recognized as involving a public interest.284  It is particularly
easy to imagine that a lawyer investigating a possible discrimination
suit might want to seek out former employees to learn about their ex-
periences and also that such former employees might well be covered
by what we will assume for the moment is a valid NDA that covers
this information.
The first question asks whether the defendant in the litigation be-
ing pursued by the lawyer—the boundary-pushing neighbor or the dis-
criminating employer—is actually engaging in illegal conduct.  Of
course, that is the question the litigation is designed to address and,
at the time this disqualification issue is raised, has not yet been re-
solved.  Indeed, this evaluation should be made as of the time the law-
yer induced the breach of contract.  At best, one could only ask
whether it appears that the lawyer was pursuing the litigation at the
time of the interference in good faith.  The second, third, and fourth
questions address whether the actor really has a commitment to the
public interest at all.  Sham public interest must be unmasked to see
what is really driving the interference.  Does the actor personally view
the practices in question as prejudicial to the public interest?   If not,
then the actor is not actually motivated by public interest.  For exam-
ple, a person who has no problem with investment in Sudan may or-
ganize a boycott to stop investment in Sudan solely to gain a
competitive advantage.
In our scenario, given that the lawyer is acting in a representative
and professional capacity, their personal beliefs as to what is in the
public interest and what is not are irrelevant.  The sexist lawyer who
diligently represents a client in a sex discrimination suit has actually
subsumed his or her private beliefs to the professional role, and it is
this professional role and the interests that it promotes that are the
most authentic in this situation.  It is hard to see how this would be a
sham on the part of the lawyer as long as an apparently non-frivolous
claim has been made.  All in all, the lawyer’s good faith in questioning
the former employee would seem to be assured by adherence to the
usual legal and ethical standards of good faith pursuit of litigation.285
In addition, the reasonableness of a lawyer’s belief that they are act-
ing in a specific public interest in pursuing good faith litigation is as-
sured when such litigation is based on statutory law or common law
rules understood as protecting the public interest.286  Similarly, a law-
yer who ethically engages in litigation to vindicate the purely private
284. Id.
285. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2009).
286. E.g., Bledsoe v. Watson, 106 Cal. Rptr. 197, 198–99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (reason-
ing that a “public policy, made explicit by statute,” encourages litigation to save
taxpayer money from illegal disbursement by providing a private right of action).
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rights of clients must also be seen to embrace the value of the rule of
law, regardless of how cynical the lawyer may actually be.
The fifth question focuses our attention on how the interfered-with
contract contributed to or furthered the continuance of the practices
that are not in the public interest.  It is hard to say precisely what this
question aims to accomplish.  It might be another way to uncover a
sham if the interfered-with contract has no effect on the objectionable
practices.  Alternatively, it might be that the closer the connection be-
tween the contract and the objectionable practices, the more public
interest value there is in interference with the contract, and vice
versa.  Therefore, we must consider the relationship between an NDA
and the practices that the litigation seeks to stop.
The most direct connection would be found in litigation about the
NDA itself, but most of the time that will not be the case.  The NDA
itself will likely be quite unrelated to the practices that are discrimi-
natory or otherwise unlawful, except for the fact that in this situation
the NDA will work to conceal information about this and other illegal
practices the employer has engaged in.  This concealment, if not bro-
ken by the breach of the agreement, allows the former employer to
continue to engage in these unlawful practices and not be legally re-
sponsible for them.  As discovery of concealed information relevant to
the illegal practice has little other value than for litigation and is, in
general, fundamental to the pursuit of any public or private interest
through litigation, it can neither be a sham nor merely “incident or
foreign to the continuance of the practices.”287
The final consideration in evaluating the propriety of interference
in the public interest is whether the means used were wrongful.  It is
meant to avoid justifying the use of tortious or otherwise wrongful
means to bring about a public interest end, so that the use of violence
to induce the breach of contract with a discriminatory employer would
be improper.  We have already considered the means that are likely to
be used by a lawyer on a former employee with an NDA to induce a
response to questions, and we have seen that absent a promise to in-
demnify and defend or conduct smacking of undue influence, there is
not likely to be wrongful conduct.
Therefore, it seems quite likely that none of the above-discussed
considerations suggesting improper interference will be present to un-
dermine a genuine specific public interest in the contemplated litiga-
tion or general public interest in enforcing the rule of law.  However, it
is not clear that successful negotiation of these considerations re-
quires a conclusion that such litigation interference is not improper.
Three more factors remain: social interest in each party’s contract or
287. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. f (1979).
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conduct, proximity of conduct to interference, and relations between
the parties.
e. The Social Interests in Protecting the Freedom of Action of
the Actor and the Contractual Interests of the Other
Whether or not a public interest is served by the interference, it is
also appropriate to consider all social interests in both the interfering
conduct and the contract, and to weigh them against each other.288
While the only social interest specifically discussed by the Restate-
ment is the social interest in competition in general, and there only in
relation to interference with prospective contractual relations, the
general suggestion is that “a stalemate” between private interests
may be “enlightened by a consideration of the social utility of these
interests.”289  Thus, in Bledsoe,290 the social interest in the actions of
county citizens who persuaded the city treasurer not to pay an attor-
ney claimed to have been illegally hired by the city outweighed the
attorney’s interest in an employment contract.291  In Zilg v. Prentice-
Hall, Inc.,292 the social utility of “communication of good faith views
about the merits of a literary work to publishers and book clubs”293
was described as outweighing the author’s interest in an existing pub-
lishing contract.294
Certainly, as a derivative of either the general public interest in
maintaining the rule of law through litigation or a specific public in-
terest furthered by this litigation, it can be argued that there is a so-
cial interest in a lawyer’s freedom to represent a client diligently295—
in the absence of otherwise illegal or unethical conduct.296  If, as dis-
cussed above, the litigation privilege would not apply to automatically
make interference of this kind by a lawyer proper, then these general
288. See Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 363 P.2d 310, 312 (Cal. 1961) (“Whether
an intentional interference by a third party is justifiable depends upon a balanc-
ing of the importance, social and private, of the objective advanced by the inter-
ference against the importance of the interest interfered with.”).
289. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. g (1979).
290. 106 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
291. Id. at 198 (finding that a “public policy, made explicit by statute” encouraging
litigation to save taxpayer money from illegal disbursement provides a weightier
social interest than a general interest in contracts).
292. 717 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).
293. Id. at 678.
294. Id.  The concurring judges found the good faith of the defendant acting in a non-
coercive manner to protect its reputation sufficient to make the interference so-
cially desirable and not improper. See id. at 682 (Pierce, J., concurring).
295. See Maynard v. Caballero, 752 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. App. 1988) (finding that the
“interest of the public in loyal, faithful and aggressive representation by the legal
profession” outweighed the plaintiff’s interest in his relationship with his own
attorney).
296. Namely, illegal or unethical conduct other than intentional interference with a
contract, which has yet to be determined.
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or specific litigation values can be weighed against the particular con-
tract interest in this case.  On the side of the employer, it would ordi-
narily be possible to argue that there is a social interest in the
enforceability of NDAs, at least to the extent they protect proprietary
information, trade secrets, and other business assets.  It is less clear
that there is social interest in allowing businesses to use a vehicle de-
signed to protect proprietary information to conceal information about
wrongdoing.  Thus, even if a court would not find the NDA void for
public policy reasons, as further explored in  the second part of this
Article, these same public policy considerations can be used to argue
that on the overall scale of social utility, the lawyer’s conduct is more
useful than the company’s.  Unfortunately, given the wide latitude
permitted to the court to weigh all these factors, there is no guarantee
that these arguments will work to convince a court that the interfer-
ence was proper.
f. The Proximity or Remoteness of the Actor’s Conduct to the
Interference
If the actor’s conduct is the direct and immediate cause of the
breach, the interference is more likely to be improper than if the
breach is only indirectly caused by the actor.  When the actor per-
suades a seller to redirect goods already under contract to a third
party, the actor directly causes the seller’s breach.  However, when the
third party therefore fails to perform their contract to sell the same
goods to a fourth party, the actor only indirectly causes the third
party’s breach.  In our scenario, if the lawyer has in fact caused the
breach at all, it will be directly rather than indirectly.  When direct
causation is present, “the other factors need not play as important a
role in the determination that the actor’s interference was im-
proper.”297  In particular, the Restatement notes that the lack of
wrongful conduct is less significant, as is the presence of mere inciden-
tal intent.298  What is left unsaid, however, is how this factor interacts
with the presence of a genuine, legitimate, and socially valuable inter-
est both motivating the interfering conduct and advanced by it.  Con-
sequently, this factor injects considerable uncertainty as to the
outcome of the analysis of impropriety in our scenario.
g. Relations Between the Parties
The final factor notes that either a competitive relationship be-
tween the actor and the party deprived of a prospective contractual
relationship or an advisory relationship between the actor and the
297. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §767 cmt. h (1979).
298. Id.
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breaching party can make the actor’s conduct proper.299  The first re-
lationship refers to the already discussed competitor’s privilege to in-
terfere using non-wrongful means with a prospective contractual
relationship.300  This will only apply to our scenario if the contract is
voidable in a jurisdiction that treats voidable contracts as prospective
contractual relations301 and if the court buys the argument that the
lawyer and former employer are competitors for the relevant informa-
tion, which is not the usual competitive relationship.302  The second
refers to the advisor’s privilege to give honest advice.  Advice from the
lawyer to the former employee is not a necessary element of our scena-
rio, but if it is present, we have seen that it may well be unethical.
This would then make the conduct improper, despite the advisor’s
privilege.  Alternatively, in a version of our scenario in which the law-
yer avoids giving such unethical advice, we would not expect to find
any special relation between the parties relevant to the propriety of
the interference.
h. Summary
Where does our hypothetical lawyer stand at the end of this analy-
sis of the propriety of their conduct?  Absent advice to the former em-
ployee or an offer to indemnify them for breach of NDA contract
damages, the nature of our lawyer’s conduct would seem to be proper.
However, any little feature of that conduct could “tip the scales” to-
ward a finding of improper interference, including the fact that the
lawyer’s causation of the interference would most likely be direct
rather than remote.  As our lawyer’s specific motive would not be to
interfere with the NDA, but to advance the litigation, the motive fac-
tor would most likely suggest that the interference is not improper.  In
particular, if our lawyer’s interest in the information is viewed as com-
petitive and the NDA in question is voidable in a jurisdiction that
treats such as a merely prospective contract, the interference will cer-
tainly not be improper.  Otherwise—e.g., valid NDA, voidable NDA
treated as existing contract, or voidable NDA but no competitive mo-
tive—we must weigh the value of the breached contract against the
value of the interfering conduct.
To the extent that a lawyer’s motive in pursuing non-frivolous liti-
gation is seen not merely as economic but rather as involving the pub-
lic interest, additional weight would be put on the not-improper side of
the scale.  Whether more weight would be granted to litigation that
299. Id. § 767 cmt. i.
300. See id. § 768; see also supra section I.A. (discussing the difference between void
and voidable contracts).
301. That is, unless the NDA is voidable in a jurisdiction that treats voidable contracts
as no more than prospective contractual relations. See supra section I.A.
302. See supra section I.A and notes 42–46.
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seeks to vindicate a special public interest than to purely private liti-
gation is not something any court has addressed.  It is also not clear
how much weight at all would be given to the enforcement of the NDA,
as this may depend on whether the court gives such agreements spe-
cific positive value as a protector of property interests in information,
general positive value as a contract, or specific negative value as a
method of concealing evidence of illegality.  Therefore, we see that
while good arguments may be available to a lawyer seeking to argue
their conduct was not improper, the fact that we cannot be absolutely
sure that the most ordinary and minimal persuasion will not be
viewed as wrongful in some way, and that the employer’s contract and
confidentiality interests will not outweigh the social and public inter-
ests in the litigation, guarantees an unpredictable result.  Not only do
we fall down the rabbit hole: with regard to this factor we cannot get
out.
III. CONCLUSION
We have seen that there are some jurisdictions in which a lawyer
with particularly good facts is not likely to be liable for intentional
interference with a contract for speaking with a former employee
about information relevant to a proposed or pending lawsuit, largely
because either actual knowledge of the NDA is required or the litiga-
tion privilege would make such conduct not improper.  Even in these
jurisdictions, the possibility of liability arises if the lawyer knows of
the NDA or if the communication happens to fall outside of the param-
eters of a more narrowly defined litigation privilege.  At the same
time, there are also many jurisdictions in which the possibility of such
liability is not foreclosed even with the best facts.  In almost all juris-
dictions, therefore, it is possible that such communications might be
unethical under Model Rule 4.4, which can serve as the basis for a
motion to disqualify.
However, the former employee must also be found to be in breach
of the non-disclosure agreement in order for intentional interference
with contract liability to attach.  In the second part of this Article,
published separately, I consider the likelihood that an employee non-
disclosure agreement would be interpreted to cover various kinds of
information that would be relevant to litigation.  While scope of cover-
age depends initially upon the language of the agreement, various
public policy considerations may also limit the enforceability of non-
disclosure agreements in this context.  At the same time, it will be
almost impossible to predict in advance when public policy will be in-
voked to make a particular non-disclosure agreement unenforceable.
With the possibility of an enforceable and breached NDA contract, and
the unpredictability of tort law as applied to this scenario, the ques-
tion of whether such conduct is unethical moves from the arena of sub-
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stantive law to ethics itself.  In the final section of the second part of
this Article, I consider the interpretation of Model Rule 4.4 itself and
conclude that there are good reasons for excluding conduct of this kind
from the reach of the rule.303
303. Strassberg, supra note 29.
